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11 Introduction
An open market share repurchase is an event where the repurchasing ﬁrm indirectly dis-
tributes cash to some of its shareholders and gets in exchange a fraction of its outstanding
equity.1 Compared to dividends, which generally are pro-rata distributions at regular
points in time, an open market repurchase distributes cash to shareholders in an non-
proportional fashion at varying points in time. Although a repurchase, at a general level,
merely is an alternative mechanism for the ﬁrm to distribute cash, it also changes the
composition of assets held by the ﬁrm, the ﬁnancing mix and alters the ownership propor-
tions of the remaining shareholders. Furthermore, a repurchase is also a more ﬂexible way
for ﬁrms to distribute excess cash if they have volatile cash streams and aim at smoothing
their dividends.
Although there is a large amount of research aimed at explaining the price eﬀect of
repurchase announcements and why ﬁrms choose to initiate a repurchase plan, there are
few studies that explicitly examine the relationship between ownership structure and share
repurchases. This despite the fact that the initiation of a repurchase plan is an impor-
tant corporate event that in some cases can alter the ownership composition signiﬁcantly
and in the long run potentially aﬀect the value of a ﬁrm through corporate governance
mechanisms. The ownership composition in a ﬁrm may also be an important motivation
for ﬁrms to initiate a repurchase plan in the ﬁrst place. As suggested by Jensen (1986) a
repurchase can help reduce the probability of incurring agency costs related to free cash.2
Thus, in ﬁrms with potentially severe agency problems, repurchases may be a way for
managers to convey to the market that they are committed to distribute excess cash back
to the owners.3 A repurchase may also help improve the governance of the ﬁrm through
other mechanisms as well. For example, in ﬁrms where there is insuﬃcient monitoring of
management,4 a repurchase may change the ownership composition such that the incen-
tives to monitor management becomes greater for some shareholders if their proportional
cash-ﬂow rights and voting rights increases. As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), open
market share repurchases are not equivalent to dividends, because they may change the
share of the ﬁrm held by the large shareholder which has greater incentives to monitor.
At the same time, a repurchase may also increase the manager’s ownership proportion
in the ﬁrm such that there is a convergence of interest between the inside and outside
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, a repurchase may also
intensify the conﬂict between large shareholders and minority shareholders. For example,
if large shareholders stronger incentives to becoming informed, a repurchase may be used
to increase their ownership (and the remaining shareholders ownership) in an undervalued
company by retaining their shares, or alternatively decrease their ownership in a over-
valued company at the expense of less informed owners (Brennan and Thakor, 1990). A
repurchase may also contribute to the conﬂict between inside- and outside owners since
1The shares owned by the company is accounted for as Treasury shares and has no cash-ﬂow or voting
rights attached to them. These shares can later be removed to decrease the shares in the company, sold
back to the market, used in acquisitions, distributed to employees as a part of a bonus plan etc.
2Jensen (1986) deﬁnes free cash as the remaining cash within the ﬁrm after all projects with positive
net present values have been funded. Other suggested mechanisms for reducing agency costs of free cash
is also new debt and dividends.
3This reasoning assumes that the managers actually have incentives to impose a disciplinary mechanism
on themselves.
4One example could be liquid ﬁrms with few investment opportunities, dispersed ownership and where
management has a low stake in the ﬁrm.
2insiders have incentives to secure their position in the ﬁrm. By repurchasing shares from
the owners with the lowest valuations (Bagwell, 1991) they increase the cost to a bid-
ding ﬁrm. Thus, a repurchase can be used to reduce the probability of a value creating
takeover occurring, which would beneﬁt shareholders, but potentially make the manager
loose control over the ﬁrms resources. Also, certain types of owners may prefer one type
of payout policy to another for tax reasons. For example certain investors such as pension
funds and non-proﬁt organizations are in many countries exempt from taxes on dividends
and capital gains, while other investors are not. Thus, if dividends and capital gains are
taxed diﬀerently, ﬁrms may attract diﬀerent types of investors through their payout pol-
icy. Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggest that one reason for the growth in repurchases
in the US, is due to relative tax disadvantage of dividends. On the other hand, ﬁndings in
Brav et al. (2003) indicate that taxes are, at best, of second order importance when ﬁrms
choose whether to repurchase or not.
The main focus of this paper is to investigate these issues in more detail, and to ex-
amine whether ﬁrms that initiate repurchase programs5 have any systematic patterns in
ownership that may be related to theory. In this respect, the paper has several objec-
tives. The ﬁrst objective is to provide a descriptive analysis of the ownership structure
of ﬁrms that announce repurchase plans, as well as for subgroups of these ﬁrms condi-
tional on whether they actually execute repurchases or not. The second objective is to
examine whether and how the ownership changes over time in ﬁrms that actually execute
repurchases. The third objective is to study whether the propensity for ﬁrms to initiate a
repurchase program may be motivated by ownership characteristics prior to the event.
Recent studies indicate that repurchases has become an increasingly important means
for ﬁrms to distribute cash. In a study on repurchase activity in the US, Grullon and
Michaely (2002) ﬁnd that ﬁrms gradually have substituted repurchases for dividends dur-
ing the period from 1980 through 2000, and that US ﬁrms in 2000 spent as much money
on repurchases as on cash dividends.6 This is also in line with ﬁndings in Fama and
French (2001) who ﬁnd that the number of dividend paying ﬁrms has fallen dramatically
since 1980 until today. Similarly, in Norway, there has been an increase in spending on
share repurchases, although for a much shorter time period. Since Norwegian ﬁrms for the
ﬁrst time were allowed to repurchase shares in 1999, they have increased their spending
on repurchases as a percentage of cash dividends starting at 25% in 1999 and increased
this to 44% in 2000 and 2001. During the same time period, there has been a growth in
aggregate dividends as well.
At a general level, a share repurchase is essentially a dividend payment, and thus an
alternative way for a ﬁrm to distribute excess cash back to its shareholders. In a world
where markets are perfect and complete, whether a ﬁrm distributes its cash through div-
idends or repurchases should be equivalent according to the propositions in Miller and
Modigliani (1961). Given the ﬁrms investment policy, no rational investor has a prefer-
ence for either payout policy, and through arbitrage arguments the choice of payout policy
5With “initiate” we mean that the ﬁrm announces a repurchase plan, which has received a supermajority
vote at the general shareholder meeting. This gives the managers of the ﬁrm the opportunity to repurchase
shares when they see ﬁt over a pre-speciﬁed period. The maximum legal length of this period in Norway
is 18 months, but the ﬁrm is not committed to repurchase any shares.
6Grullon and Michaely (2002) ﬁnd that dividend payouts grew at an annual rate of 6.8% during the
period 1980 to 2000, while cash used on share repurchases grew at an annual rate of 26.1% during the
same period. From 1980 to 2000 share repurchases as a percentage of dividends increased from 13.1% in
1980 to 113.1% in 2000.
3is shown to be irrelevant with respect to the value of the ﬁrm. On the other hand, empiri-
cal results suggest that the information inherent in repurchase announcements have some
economical beneﬁts to shareholders in the sense that these ﬁrms on average experience
an abnormal price increase when they announce that they are planning on repurchasing
shares. Among others, Vermaelen (1981), Dann (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991),
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000), ﬁnd strong support for a
positive announcement eﬀect, and that this eﬀect is about 2%.7 These ﬁndings are com-
parable to what has been found with respect to unexpected dividend initiations/increases
and dividend omissions/decreases (Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Michaely et al., 1995).
The dominating theoretical explanation for both of these announcement eﬀects rests
on a signalling framework, in which there is asymmetric information between the managers
and outside investors, and the announcement communicates valuable information about
current earnings and the future prospects of the ﬁrm. As shown in Miller and Rock (1985),
if there is asymmetric information between investors and the managers of a ﬁrm, changes
in dividends can result in revaluations. Similarly for repurchases, models by Vermaelen
(1981), Ofer and Thakor (1987), Constantinides and Grundy (1989), McNally (1999) and
others, show that a repurchase announcement may be a valuable signal to investors about
current undervaluation and the future prospects of the ﬁrm, which should command a
higher stock price. In addition to the signalling hypothesis, other suggested reasons for why
ﬁrms repurchase shares include, capital structure adjustments (Vermaelen, 1981; Opler and
Titman, 1996), disgorgement of excess cash (Jensen, 1986; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998;
Jagannathan et al., 2000), substitution for cash dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 2002),
takeover defense (Denis, 1990; Bagwell, 1991; Dittmar, 2000), shareholder expropriation
(Brennan and Thakor, 1990), to counter the dilution eﬀects of employee and management
options (Fenn and Liang, 1997), personal taxes (Masulis, 1980; Lie and Lie, 1999; Grullon
and Michaely, 2002) and manipulating EPS ﬁgures (Bens et al., 2002).
With respect to the topic in this paper, the amount of research that examine the
relationship between ownership structure and share repurchases is much more scarce.
However, some exceptions include Ginglinger and L’Her (2002) who examine the relation-
ship between ownership structure and the announcement eﬀect for French ﬁrms, Howe
et al. (2003) who examine the relation between insider ownership and the announcement
eﬀect of various cash distributions in the US, including tender oﬀer repurchases, and Li
and McNally (2002) who examine the insider holdings of repurchasing ﬁrms. The results
in Ginglinger and L’Her (2002) suggests that the announcement eﬀect of controlled ﬁrms
is stronger than for widely held ﬁrms, that the presence of foreign institutional investors
yield a more positive reaction and that family controlled ﬁrms experience a negative price
eﬀect when a repurchase program is announced. They also ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a low
likelihood of takeover and low risk of minority shareholder expropriation experience a
stronger positive announcement eﬀect, and that the eﬀect is highly unfavorable when the
market participants interpret the repurchase as a takeover defense.8 Howe et al. (2003)
7Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Ikenberry et al. (1995) ﬁnd an announcement eﬀect in the US of 2.3%
(for the period 1985-1988) and 3.5% (1980-1990) respectively. In addition Comment and Jarrell (1991)
examine Dutch auction repurchases and tender oﬀer repurchases, which have a 11% and 8% price impact
respectively. They argue that tender oﬀer repurchases have the strongest signalling ability of the three.
For Canada, Li and McNally (2002) ﬁnd a announcement eﬀect of 0.9% (for the period 1995-1999). Lasfer
(2000) ﬁnd the eﬀect to be 1.64% in the UK, 1% for continental Europe, 0.78% in France and 0.63% for
Italy over the period 1985 to 1998.
8Ginglinger and L’Her (2002) proxy potential target ﬁrms as ﬁrms where the largest shareholder owns
20% of the voting rights and the ﬂoat is higher than 50%.
4ﬁnd that there is a positive relationship between the excess return around various cash
distribution events9 and the insider ownership for a sample of US ﬁrms. Their overall
conclusion is that when managers owns a larger stake in the ﬁrm, their wealth depends
stronger on the success of corporate decisions and strategy such that the signals conveyed
through payout announcements becomes more valuable/credible in ﬁrms where the inside
ownership is large. Li and McNally (2002) also study the insider holdings of repurchasing
ﬁrms and ﬁnd that insiders have a larger stake in ﬁrms that initiate repurchase plans,
and that these ﬁrms experience a greater announcement eﬀect. Their main argument
for this is that insiders use repurchases to signal that they are committed to distribute
excess cash back to the shareholders. In addition, Denis (1990) examines the price eﬀect
of defensive changes in corporate payout policy and how the ownership changes in ﬁrms
that remain independent after the takeover contest. The results indicate that these ﬁrms
experience large structural changes after the takeover attempt in which there are large
changes in capital- and ownership structure in addition to a high turnover rate among top
management. Finally, Grinstein and Michaely (2001) examine the eﬀect of institutional
ownership on the choice of payout policy among ﬁrms. Their main ﬁnding is that insti-
tutions increase their ownership in ﬁrms that repurchase, but that they do not actively
aﬀect ﬁrms payout policy or cause ﬁrms to increase their overall payout.
There are also earlier studies on the ownership structure of Norwegian ﬁrms that are
important to mention. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000, 2004) provide a detailed description of
the ownership structure of Norwegian ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock exchange for the period
1989-1997. In addition, using the same dataset, Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) examine
whether ownership structure matters for economic performance. Their main ﬁndings are
that insider ownership enhances ﬁrm value while ownership concentration is negatively
related to ﬁrm value.10 They also point to Norway being an atypical case relative to the
ownership structure in other countries in Europe due to very high state ownership as well
as relatively high foreign ownership (about 30%). In addition, the ownership by personal
investors is found to be the smallest compared to any European country, and the largest
shareholder owns much less while the second and third largest owner has a relatively high
stake indicating that the power structure is very ﬂat.
The analysis in this paper uses similar ownership data as used in Bøhren and Ødegaard
(2000, 2001, 2004), but for a more recent period and with monthly share-holdings of all
shareholders in all public Norwegian ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE).
The paper combines this dataset with a sample of repurchase announcements and actual
repurchases conducted by Norwegian ﬁrms for the period 1999 through 2001.11 There are
several things to note about the dataset. First of all, there are few papers that examine
the actual repurchase activity of announcing ﬁrms. One reason for this is that a large
amount of studies on open market repurchases has been for US data. Due to the loose
disclosure rules in the US, where ﬁrms are not required to disclose the actual repurchase
executions, this has made it diﬃcult to obtain detailed data on actual repurchases in the
US.12 By combining the repurchase dataset with a detailed ownership database containing
9The cash distributions they examine are dividend increases and decreases, dividend initiations and
tender oﬀer repurchases.
10While their results are robust in single-equation models, the relationships are rendered insigniﬁcant
when they apply simultaneous equations models taking into account the causalities between governance
and performance.
11The repurchase sample starts in 1999 because Norwegian ﬁrms were not allowed to repurchase shares
earlier. However, ﬁrms were allowed to announce repurchase plans prior to 1999.
12One exception is Stephens and Weisbach (1998) who estimate the actual repurchase activity by US
5the monthly equity holdings of all shareholders in all listed Norwegian ﬁrms, we are able
to study in detail the ownership characteristics of these ﬁrms. In addition, we are able
to examine to what degree the composition changes during the repurchase program and
whether ownership characteristics aﬀect ﬁrms propensity to initiate such programs.
To summarize our main ﬁndings, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that announce at least one repur-
chase program during our sample period, have a signiﬁcantly lower ownership concentra-
tion (both when concentration is measured as the aggregate ownership of the ﬁve largest
owners and by the Herﬁndahl index) than ﬁrms that do not announce a repurchase plan.
With respect to the number of owners, announcing ﬁrms have about twice as many owners
as non-announcing ﬁrms, while the average size of these ﬁrms are similar. This is in line
with a story in which ﬁrms with dispersed ownership has a stronger incentive to disgorge
cash to mitigate agency costs related to free cash. On the other hand, our results also
suggest that insiders own on average a signiﬁcantly higher fraction (20%) in announcing
ﬁrms than in non-announcing ﬁrms (8%), and that this diﬀerence is most pronounced in
ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares. This, however, is not consistent with a monitoring
story for repurchases, since agency theory predicts that the insider and outsider interests
are better aligned in these ﬁrms. Moreover, there would be a lesser need for additional
mechanisms to avoid agency costs of free cash in these ﬁrms.
This ﬁnding would instead be more in line with models where insiders have incentives to
initiate a repurchase program either to maximize the future value of their personal wealth
(Isagawa, 2000), expropriate outside shareholders or to entrench themselves. Moreover,
Isagawa (2000) argue that if managers have stock options or ownership in the ﬁrm, the
managers objective function depends on the stock price as he gets a monetary compensa-
tion based on the future value of the ﬁrm. By repurchasing, this reﬂects that the manager
has no proﬁtable projects to invest in, and that his private beneﬁts from increasing the
value of the ﬁrm outweighs the personal beneﬁt from investing in negative net present
value projects, which would depress the stock price in the long run and reduce his wealth.
Thus, Isagawa (2000) propose an explanation for the announcement eﬀect which resolves
the credibility issues, in addition to oﬀering a prediction that repurchasing ﬁrms have
a high insider ownership. Our ﬁnding may also be consistent with an mispricing story
where there in asymmetric information between the inside- and the outside sharehold-
ers as suggested in models by Barclay and Smith (1988) as well as Brennan and Thakor
(1990) when large shareholders are better informed than smaller shareholders. From this
point of view, the insiders may use repurchases to transfer wealth from selling sharehold-
ers to themselves (and remaining shareholders) by retaining their shares when the ﬁrm
repurchase. Our results also indicate that the dividend payments of announcing ﬁrms are
lower than for non-announcing ﬁrms, which is consistent with a hypothesis where ﬁrms
substitute repurchases for dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). When examining the
changes in ownership variables during the periods when ﬁrms repurchase shares the re-
sults conﬁrm that the concentration increases. However, although there is an increase in
the insider ownership, it is not signiﬁcant. With respect to the diﬀerent ownertypes, the
results further indicate that the ownership by institutions and individuals falls, while the
state ownership increases. Interestingly, this is opposite from what Grinstein and Michaely
(2001) ﬁnd for institutional investors in the US. Grinstein and Michaely (2001) argue their
results are inconsistent with models in which ﬁrms use dividends to attract institutional
ﬁrms based on the change in outstanding shares. In addition, during the last few years, studies on actual
repurchase activity outside the US has emerged for markets where ﬁrms are subject to stricter disclosure
rules, such as Canada.
6investors. Our results may indicate an opposite eﬀect for Norway.
In the second part of the paper, we estimate binary models for the probability of ob-
serving a ﬁrm announcing a repurchase plan during each sample year given the ownership
characteristic at the beginning of the year. The results from these estimations reﬂect
to a great degree the ﬁndings in the descriptive part of the analysis, but provide some
additional results. With respect to the insider ownership, we ﬁnd that the propensity
to initiate a repurchase program increases with insider ownership. This is in line with
ﬁndings in Li and McNally (2002) for Canada. In addition, while ownership concentration
seem to be unimportant, a large controlling shareholder reduces the propensity for ﬁrms
to initiate a repurchase program. This is the opposite of what is the prediction in the
model by Brennan and Thakor (1990). One implication from their model is that large
shareholders will prefer repurchases to dividends, while small shareholders will prefer div-
idends. Our ﬁndings instead suggests that a controlling shareholder opposes the initiation
of a repurchase program. Alternatively, it may also reﬂect a lower need for additional
mechanisms to mitigate agency costs of free cash when there is a large shareholder in
place with suﬃcient incentives to monitor the management. We also examine whether the
identity13 of the largest shareholder is important, but ﬁnd no systematic evidence. The
estimation results also provide evidence that ﬁrms that paid dividends in the previous year
have a lower propensity to initiate a repurchase plan. This is likely related to dividend
smoothing, and that ﬁrms are reluctant to cutting dividends as suggested by ﬁndings in
Lintner (1956) and Brav et al. (2003).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss
theoretical and empirical results that motivate why there could be a relationship between
ownership structure and ﬁrms choice of repurchasing. Then we give an overview of the
repurchase methods and history of repurchases in Norway, the Norwegian tax system as
well as some information about the corporate legal environment in Norway. In section 4
we discuss the datasets and provide some general statistics, before we in in section 5 and
section 6 present and discuss our results and conclude in section 7.
2 Ownership structure and repurchases
In this section, we try to motivate why there could be a relationship between ownership
structure and the choice by ﬁrms to initiate a repurchase program. Although the main
purpose of the paper is to provide a descriptive analysis of repurchasing ﬁrms, it is nec-
essary to have a theoretical framework in which we can interpret the results and guide
the analysis as well to motivate various variables used when we estimate a model for the
propensity for ﬁrms to announce a repurchase plan. However, as discussed in Bøhren
and Ødegaard (2000, 2001) corporate governance has still an underdeveloped theoretical
foundation. This also aﬀect the present paper in the sense that there are few models
directly relating ﬁrms choice of repurchases to ownership structure and corporate gover-
nance. In other words, there are few models with clear predictions with respect to what
patterns we should expect to see. Due to the lack of a testable theory, the discussion
of the results will to a large degree be partial. However, some models provide implicit
theoretical prediction for the relationship between ownership structure, corporate gover-
nance mechanisms and stock repurchases which we will discuss below. At a general level,
13We have information on ﬁve types of owners. These are “state” owners, “foreigners”, “ﬁnancial”,
“non-ﬁnancial” and “individuals”.
7it is useful to distinguish between agency- and signalling models used in the literature to
explain why ﬁrms repurchase shares and experience a positive announcement eﬀect. In
the agency models, the principal (shareholder) wants to ensure that the agent (manager)
do not waste internal resources to beneﬁt themselves. In these models, repurchases may
be used as a mechanism to discipline the manager and reduce the cash available to him.
The agency explanations however require that the shareholders can force the manager to
actually repurchase or that the manager has incentives to do so. Also, if large shareholders
or insiders own a large stake in the ﬁrm, it may be diﬃcult to initiate a repurchase plan in
the ﬁrst place, since it in most cases requires a supermajority vote which can be blocked by
a large shareholder. In addition, to ensure that the manager actually execute repurchases
when there are no proﬁtable investment opportunities may require excessive monitoring.
As discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), it is generally impossible for the principal to
costlessly ensure that the agent will act optimally from the principals viewpoint. Thus,
even though a repurchase is a cash distribution mechanism that initially could help reduce
agency costs, it may not be very eﬀective unless the manager has incentives to disgorge
free cash. In the signalling models, the manager may use repurchases to signal that they
are committed to not wasting cash, or to convey information to the market about their
private information. However, as will be discussed below, the credibility of the signal is
not always clear, since the costs to the manager for signalling falsely may be questionable.
This is especially important with respect to open market share repurchases.
Free cash ﬂow
Agency theory predicts that non-owner managers will tend to divert parts of the ﬁrm’s free
cash ﬂow to value-destroying projects that provide private beneﬁts to themselves.14 More
speciﬁcally, as discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), if there is low or zero insider
ownership, and consequently a separation of ownership from control, there may be a need
for monitoring by outside shareholders to avoid that management uses internal resources
in a fashion that does not maximize ﬁrm value.15 However, active monitoring by outside
owners may not occur if there are no outside owners with strong incentives to monitor the
management.
In those cases payout policy is a mechanism that may help to mitigate agency costs
related to cash. As suggested by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) a ﬁrm may use
cash distributions to reduce the agency cost of free cash by reducing the amount of cash
available to the manager. Agency theory predicts that both debt ﬁnancing, repurchases
and dividend payments are mechanisms that help mitigating agency costs. With debt
ﬁnancing, the cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm must be used to pay creditors which potentially could
force a bankruptcy if not paid. Dividend payments are also a way for the ﬁrm to dis-
tribute excess cash that could potentially be miss-allocated by management. The use
of repurchases is potentially less costly to the ﬁrm than using dividends for distributing
non-sustainable excess cash. As proposed by Lintner (1956), managers prefer to increase
dividends regularly and avoid cutting dividends if possible.16 Substantiating the ﬁnding
14As discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) such diversion by insiders may be theft, dilution of outside
investors through share issues to insiders, salary increases, below market value share issues to insiders etc.
15A crucial assumption with respect to outside monitoring is that outside shareholders are competent
and that their monitoring in fact improve the quality of managerial decisions.
16These arguments predict that dividend increases will be made by ﬁrms with higher and more stable cash
ﬂows, that dividend increases will be related to permanent but not necessarily to temporary components
of cash ﬂow, and that dividend decreases will be less frequent than increases and accompanied by very
8in Lintner (1956), 94% of the company executives interviewed in Brav et al. (2003), state
that they strongly try to avoid dividend cuts, and 65% answered that they would raise
external funds before they would cut dividends. This suggest that managers view dividend
cuts as costly. One reason for this is that dividend decreases generally are punished by the
market as found in Denis et al. (1994) among others.17 Thus, ﬁrms may be reluctant to
increasing dividends if the cash-ﬂow is non-sustainable. In addition, studies suggests that
ﬁrms aim at a target ratio and tries to smooth dividends. Thus, an unexpected dividend
increase may be a stronger signal about permanent future earnings, while a repurchase
announcement may convey to the market that management is committed to not wasting
temporary cash on private beneﬁts and value destroying activities.
With respect to the relationship between repurchases and ownership structure, a ﬁrm
with plenty of cash, few investment opportunities, low insider ownership and dispersed
outside ownership may beneﬁt from using repurchases in distributing excess cash to miti-
gate agency costs. This in the sense that a repurchase announcement could be a signal to
the market from the primary insiders that they are committed to not wasting excess cash.
Overall, from an agency perspective, if repurchases are motivated by poor monitoring, we
would expect to see more dispersed ownership and lower ownership concentration in ﬁrms
that announce repurchase plans. In addition, one would also expect to see a lower insider
ownership in these ﬁrms, since high insider ownership initially would reduce the need for
monitoring. On the other hand, for the managers to support the initiation of a repurchase
program as a self-imposed disciplinary mechanism, the manager must have incentives to
do so. In a model by Isagawa (2000), the initiation of a repurchase program is argued to be
credible despite the fact that the announcement of a repurchase plan is not a commitment
to actually repurchase shares. The model by Isagawa (2000) assumes that the managers
objective function depends on the stock price, as he gets a monetary compensation based
on the future price of the ﬁrm (the manager may have stock options or own a part of
the ﬁrm), in addition that he has a private beneﬁt from growing the size of the ﬁrm. By
announcing a repurchase plan, this reﬂects that the manager has no proﬁtable investment
opportunities, and that the cost to him for wasting internal cash is greater than returning
cash to the shareholders and increasing the value of the ﬁrm. Thus, the announcement
of a repurchase plan reveals information about the managers private beneﬁts when there
are no proﬁtable investment opportunities available to the ﬁrm. Li and McNally (2002)
ﬁnd support for this model in that insiders have a larger stake in ﬁrms that announce
repurchase plans.
Empirical results in Fenn and Liang (2001), suggest that there is a negative relationship
between management stock ownership and the amount of cash distribution. They ﬁnd
that ﬁrms in which managers has a low ownership stake, few investment opportunities
(or high free cash ﬂow) pays out more cash. These are ﬁrms that potentially have the
highest agency problem. However, although higher insider ownership is one mechanism
that align managers interests with shareholders, it is also argued that greater ownership
by institutional owners or other large shareholders may improve outside monitoring of
the management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Grinstein and Michaely (2001) investigate
the relationship between ﬁrms payout policy and institutional ownership in the US, for
the period 1980 through 1996, and ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms attract institutions through
their payout policy. More speciﬁcally, their results suggests that institutions increase
poor performance.
17Some proposed explanations for this has been signalling, overinvestment and dividend clienteles.
9their holdings in ﬁrms that repurchase more shares, and decrease their holdings in ﬁrms
that pay more dividends. In addition, when examining the causality between institutional
ownership and payout policy, their results indicate that institutions do not actively change
dividend policy or repurchase policy.
The signalling/undervaluation hypothesis
The traditional signalling hypothesis with respect to repurchases proposed by Vermaelen
(1981, 1984) and Dann (1981), among others, is motivated by asymmetric information
between the managers of a ﬁrm and the market. If the managers of the ﬁrm has superior
information about the future prospect of the ﬁrm, and know that the ﬁrm is undervalued,
they can initiate a repurchase plan to convey this information. Due to the new informa-
tion about future earnings, implied by the announcement, a positive price impact on the
announcement day is expected, as prices adjusts to the new information. Since the un-
dervaluation hypothesis supposes that the managers of the ﬁrm has superior information
about the true value of the ﬁrm, and that the managers successfully announce repurchase
plans when the ﬁrm is truly undervalued, one would also expect the insiders of the ﬁrm
to have a higher ownership fraction in these ﬁrms if they are able to trade in the ﬁrms
shares.18
However, there is a problematic issue related to the signalling hypothesis and the
incentives of the managers of a ﬁrm discussed in Fried (2002). The signalling hypothesis
implies that managers signal only when the ﬁrm is undervalued, and thereby sacriﬁce
their own wealth on behalf of the shareholders.19 The proposition in Fried (2002) is that
it is more likely that managers act opportunistically, and announce repurchase plans to
maximize their own wealth. One prediction of the model is that managers announce a
repurchase plan both when the ﬁrm is undervalued as well as when it is overvalued. The
main intuition behind this is that when the ﬁrm is undervalued, the manager uses the
announcement of a plan, as well as actual repurchases, to transfer wealth to themselves
and the remaining shareholders. On the other hand, when the manager want to sell a
large part of her shares due to overvaluation, the repurchase announcement can be used
to temporarily boost the stock price. Another argument against the signalling hypothesis
is that for the signal conveyed through the announcement of a repurchase plan to be
credible, there should be an explicit commitment by the managers of the ﬁrm.20 However,
for open market share repurchases, it is rarely the case that insiders of a ﬁrm explicitly
states that they are going to retain their shares for the course of the repurchase plan. Fried
(2002) argue that managers could more credibly signal undervaluation by committing to
retaining their shares over a period of time.
Thus, in the managerial opportunism case of Fried (2002), the prediction with respect
to the level of insider ownership relative to non-announcing ﬁrms is not clear since the
managers may choose to announce a repurchase plan both when the ﬁrm is undervalued
and overvalued. With respect to the signaling hypothesis, however, one would expect
18Primary insiders are generally constrained from trading in company shares around major information
disclosures. However, a repurchase announcement is not generally considered as an information release
where the ﬁrm announce fundamental information. In these cases, it is up to the ﬁrm to deﬁne a “blackout”
period for the insiders in which they are not allowed to trade company shares.
19The main argument for this is that the announcement reduces the managers ﬁnancial ﬂexibility as well
as limits the potential proﬁts that they can reap from the information.
20At least, there should be an implicit commitment in the sense that the initial signal is backed by actual
repurchases at a later point in time.
10insider ownership to be greater in announcing ﬁrms if the managers in these ﬁrms exploit
their private information.21
Management stock options
Fenn and Liang (2001) ﬁnd evidence that managers substitute repurchases for dividends
to increase the value of their stock options. More speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd a strong negative
relationship between dividend payouts and management stock options and a positive rela-
tionship between repurchase activity and stock options. Their main interpretation of this
ﬁnding is that managers will have incentives to reduce dividends and increase repurchases
(or retain more cash) because the value of the managers stock options are negatively re-
lated to expected future dividend payments. However, as noted by Fenn and Liang (2001),
there are alternative explanations for a positive relationship between share repurchases and
stock options. One explanation could be that options increase the managers incentives to
maximize the value of the ﬁrm, and therefore also increase proﬁts that is distributed to
the shareholders. Another explanation may be that ﬁrms use repurchases to counter the
dilution eﬀects of employee and management options, such that the increased repurchase
activity in ﬁrms with large amounts of management options is a direct result of option
exercises.
With respect to how stock options relate to the ownership structure of repurchasing
ﬁrms, one might expect there to be higher insider ownership in repurchasing ﬁrms if
repurchases are substituted for dividends to maximize stock option values. However the
prediction is not clear in the sense that risk averse managers with already a stake in the
ﬁrm, through stock ownership as well as labor income, may want to reduce their ownership
fraction when they are granted more options for diversiﬁcation reasons.
Expropriation of minority shareholders
So far our discussion has centered around the the potential conﬂict between the manage-
ment in a ﬁrm and the outside shareholders. However, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), if large controlling shareholders participate in, or is closely connected to, the ﬁrms
management,22 or have enough power to inﬂuence the decision process within the ﬁrm,
there may also be a conﬂict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
For example, large shareholders may use the resources of a ﬁrm to beneﬁt themselves on
the expense of minority shareholder. If large shareholders are better informed than smaller
shareholders, repurchases may be used by controlling shareholders to increase their own-
ership further (by retaining their shares) on behalf of smaller shareholders when they have
favorable information about the ﬁrm. When a ﬁrm executes repurchases in the market,
the sellers are current shareholders who, unknowingly, are trading with the ﬁrm in the
open market. Thus, the cash distribution is essentially involuntary23 in the sense that the
sellers may not have wanted to sell any shares at the current price if they had known that
21An behavioral interpretation could be that insiders have a higher ownership in announcing ﬁrms
because these managers are over-optimistic with respect to their own abilities in generating value as well
as to the ﬁrms future prospects.
22Gomes and Novaes (2002) shows that the conﬂict between controlling shareholders and minority share-
holders may increase when the controlling shareholders also participate in the management of the ﬁrm.
23As opposed to a tender oﬀer repurchase where the selling shareholders know beforehand that they are
selling shares back to the ﬁrm. In addition, tender oﬀer repurchases are generally executed at a premium
to the market price, while own market share repurchases are executed at the prevailing market price.
11the ﬁrm was the buyer. If there is asymmetric information between the managers of the
ﬁrm and the market place, and the managers are able to correctly time their repurchases
accordingly, the selling shareholders execute trades against an informed investor and sell
shares at a price below fair value. Thus, if large controlling shareholders has superior
information about ﬁrm value either through their potentially closer connection to the
management or through their greater incentives to collect information, they are also more
likely to retain their shares relative to small shareholders when the ﬁrm actually execute
repurchases due to mispricing. Brennan and Thakor (1990) develop a theory for ﬁrms
choice among several ways of paying out cash to shareholders in which there is a wealth
distribution from small uninformed shareholders to large, better informed, shareholders.
Their model assumes that the collection of information by investors is costly, and that
stock prices does not reﬂect all information. Since large shareholders have greater incen-
tives to becoming informed, small shareholders may face the risk of being expropriated
by large shareholders. Thus, small uninformed shareholders has a co-ordination prob-
lem and are unable to keep their ownership fraction constant in the event when a ﬁrm
repurchases shares. Moreover, they tend to be left with a greater ownership fraction in
overvalued ﬁrms (when insiders or larger shareholders sell), and a lower ownership fraction
in undervalued ﬁrms (when the ﬁrm and better informed investors buy). The center of
their argument is that non-proportionate share repurchases forces shareholders to collect
information and incur the gathering costs or alternatively run the risk of expropriation by
better informed investors. As a result of this, large shareholders prefer cash to be paid out
through repurchases instead of dividends, while small, potentially less informed, investors
prefer dividends since these are paid pro-rata and do not bear such adverse selection costs.
The model of Brennan and Thakor (1990) is also related to the hypothesis of Barclay
and Smith (1988) who argue that there is a implicit cost associated with repurchases.24
Their main hypothesis is that a repurchase plan increases the adverse selection component
of the spread in the market, which again may increase the cost of capital for the ﬁrm. If
this eﬀect is large enough, ﬁrms would prefer to use dividends instead of repurchases. In
line with their hypothesis, they ﬁnd that the spread increases after the ﬁrm has announced
a repurchase plan, and decreases to its pre-announcement level after the repurchase plan is
completed. In other words, the increased bid-ask spread captures the increased probability
of trading with an informed investor (the ﬁrm or the insiders of the ﬁrm).
Takeover defense and entrenchment
Another motivation for management to support the initiation of a repurchase plan, as well
as actually execute repurchases, is to reduce the probability of takeovers. This because
a hostile takeover, if successful, could result in the manager being replaced and loose
control over the ﬁrms resources. In a hostile takeover, the acquiring ﬁrm makes an oﬀer
to the shareholders of the ﬁrm. Thus, if the ﬁrms ownership is dispersed it is more
likely that the bidding ﬁrm will be able to successfully take control. Repurchases is one25
eﬀective measure for managers to reduce the probability that a takeover will be successful.
Stulz (1988), argues that a stock repurchase increases the proportion of shares held by
the manager and stockholders supporting him, such that it becomes more diﬃcult to
24Their motivation was initially to explain why ﬁrms use dividends instead of repurchases to pay out
cash despite the relative tax advantage of capital gains to dividends in the US.
25Among other things, managers can also adapt anti-takeover amendments, ”poison pills”, increase their
ownership proportion etc. to oppose takeover attempts.
12obtain enough shares to take control of the ﬁrm. Bagwell (1991) propose a model with
heterogenous valuations among current shareholders and an upward sloping supply curve
for the company shares. Thus, by repurchasing shares at the current market price, the
shareholders with the lowest valuations are removed, such that a more expensive group of
shareholders are left, implying that the cost of acquiring shares is increased. Also, Bagnoli
and Lipman (1989) develop a model where they assume asymmetric information between
the managers and the market. By signalling the quality of their ﬁrm through repurchases,
this convinces the current shareholders that the value of the company is higher such that
a takeover becomes more costly. However, as shown in Denis (1990), when a repurchase
announcement is interpreted as a takeover defense, the announcement eﬀect is highly
unfavorable.
Thus, while managers have incentives to oppose takeovers, ﬁrms with characteristics
that make them likely takeover candidates is expected to be more likely to announce re-
purchase plans and execute repurchases. The characteristics of a takeover candidate may
depend on many factors, but generally, undervalued ﬁrms, with low managerial owner-
ship and low ownership concentration (dispersed ownership) may be more likely takeover
candidates. Thus, managers in ﬁrms with these characteristics may have stronger incen-
tives to entrench themselves and use repurchases to increase their ownership as well as to
remove shareholders with the lowest valuations.
3 Regulatory and institutional aspects
3.1 Repurchase methods
There are mainly three methods for ﬁrms to repurchase their own shares; through tender
oﬀers, open market transactions or via privately negotiated transactions, also referred to
as Dutch auction repurchases. The two ﬁrst methods are used to a larger extent than the
latter, and in the US, open market transactions are observed more frequently than tender
oﬀers. In fact, 90% of the cases between 1985 and 1993 were open market transactions as
discussed in Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998). However, the size
of an open market share repurchase is in general of much smaller magnitude than a tender
oﬀer repurchase. In a tender oﬀer, the reacquiring ﬁrm oﬀers to repurchase its shares at
a speciﬁc price, usually at a premium to the market price (ﬁxed price tender oﬀers). In
an open market repurchase, on the other hand, the purchase is executed through brokers
in the open market at normal commissions rates, and no premium is paid.26 Thus, open
market repurchases is the same as a sequence of tender oﬀer repurchases, where the bid
price is the tender price. Since tender oﬀers are generally larger in magnitude than an open
market repurchases, the alternative of trading the shares directly in the market through
open market repurchases, would potentially incur a price impact cost to the ﬁrm that
would exceed the premium oﬀered through the tender price, making tender oﬀers more
attractive for large distributions.
26At least no direct premium is paid. As argued by Barclay and Smith (1988), the announcement
of a repurchase plan may lead to increased spread in the market due to an increased adverse selection
component in the spread. Thus, by announcing a repurchase plan, the ﬁrm itself may experience higher
implicit transactions costs in the primary market when it executes repurchases.
133.2 The introduction of repurchases in Norway
The 1st of January, 1999, the Securities Act of June 13 1997 went into eﬀect, and Nor-
wegian ﬁrms were allowed to repurchase their own shares. The Act states that ﬁrms are
allowed to repurchase up to 10% of the outstanding shares as long as the ﬁrm’s total equity
value in excess of the ﬁrm’s own stockholdings is higher than 1 mill. NOK. Such limited
open market repurchase programs are often referred to as ”Normal Course Issuer Bids”,
whereas ﬁxed price tender oﬀers which do not have any limit to the amount of stock that
can be repurchased is commonly called ”Substantial Issuer Bids”.
In Norway, as in the US and other countries, the most frequently observed repurchase
method is open market repurchases executed as a part of a Normal Course Issuer Bid,
simply because Substantial Issuer Bids are only observed in a few instances. In this paper,
we only examine open market shares repurchases. Furthermore, the OSE listed ﬁrms do
not have to receive approval from the exchange before initiating a repurchase program. In
the U.S. the same rule applies as in Norway. However, Canadian ﬁrms (see Ikenberry et al.
(2000)), must receive approval from the exchange before they can initiate a repurchase
program. In Norway, as in most countries, the managers must be authorized by the
stockholders to initiate a repurchase program. Such an authorization is eﬀective for the
time period stated in the plan, or at most 18 months which is the legal limit. After the
repurchase period has expired, there must be a new vote before the ﬁrm can continue to
repurchase shares. When a ﬁrm carries out an open market transaction announcement
rules apply, i.e. the ﬁrm must inform the OSE before the trading starts the following day.
However, if the trade is considered as being informative, the general rule is that it must
be announced to the OSE immediately.
3.3 The corporate environment
The main laws regulating corporations in Norway are Aksjeloven (the corporate law),
Verdipapirhandelsloven (the securities law) and Børsloven (Oslo Stock Exchange regula-
tions).27 With respect to the board structure, all listed ﬁrms with more than 200 employees
is required to have a supervisory board which elects the board. The supervisory board
consists of 1/3 from the employees and 2/3 owners, and the board consists by 1/3 of the
employees candidates and 2/3 consists of the owners candidates. With respect to to open
market share repurchase programs, any owner can suggest that an repurchase program is
put on the agenda for the ordinary stockholder meeting. In addition, an owner, or group
of owners, representing at least 5% of the cash ﬂow rights can force an extraordinary
stockholder meeting. A repurchase program is deﬁned as a change in the corporate char-
ter, and requires a super-majority vote of 2/3 from the voting shares represented at the
shareholder meeting. In addition, it requires a 2/3 vote from all shareholders (including
holders of non-voting shares) to be passed. Thus, non-voting shares may be important
when it comes to proposals for changing the corporate charter. There are also a set of
regulations in place to protect minority shareholders. First, any shareholder has to report
to the ﬁrm and the Oslo Stock Exchange when it passes through various thresholds.28
If a stockholder passes 40% of the voting rights in a ﬁrm, he has to give a tender oﬀer
(Mandatory Bid) to the remaining shareholders, and if he owns at least 90% of the shares
27A detailed description of the regulatory environment in Norway can be found in Bøhren and Ødegaard
(2000).
28These thresholds were 10%, 20%, 33%, 50%, 67% and 90% during the sample period.
14he is required to buy from any shareholder that wants to sell shares.
There are also insider trading rules that ﬁrst of all restrict all insiders from trading
on ﬁrm speciﬁc information that is important for the pricing of the stock. Furthermore,
primary insiders, such as board members and the management team, are restricted from
trading around various corporate events. For example, they are not allowed to trade two
months before the publication of annual reports. In periods when they are allowed to
trade, strict disclosure rules apply as the insider must report the transaction to the OSE
within the trading starts the next day (10 am). Primary insiders are deﬁned as members
of the management team, board members and substitutes. The broader deﬁnition of
all insiders also include company auditors, and the primary insiders immediate families.
With respect to open market share repurchases, similar disclosure rules apply, as the ﬁrm
is required to report their transactions before the market opens the next day.
3.4 The Norwegian tax system
Dividends distributed from a Norwegian tax resident public- or private limited company
were taxed fully on the investor’s hand until 1992. As a result of an extensive tax-reform
in 1992, dividends became tax-exempt while the capital gains tax was set at a ﬂat rate of
28%, both for individuals, companies and private pension funds.29 However, shareholders
in ﬁrms that retain a part of their after tax earnings, may experience that some of the
capital gains when the shares are sold reﬂect a price increase due to the retained earnings.
To eliminate the double taxation this would imply, an adjustment is made. The retained
earnings per share is added to the cost basis (usually the purchase price) such that the
capital gain/tax basis is reduced accordingly (RISK adjustment).30 Thus, during the
period 1992 until 2001, dividends were not taxed on the investor’s hand at all, and tax on
capital gains linked to retained earnings was eliminated.31 The result of this was that there
were essentially was no preference in the tax system between capital gains or regular cash
distributions. However, in 2001, a personal tax on dividends was re-introduced, at a rate of
11%, while the capital gains tax and corporate tax remained at 28%. With respect to the
dividend taxation, a basic deduction of NOK 10 000 was introduced. Thus, small investors
in dividend paying ﬁrms were not directly aﬀected by the tax increase. However, for larger
investors the total taxation on dividends increased from 28% to 35.92%, due to the double
taxation of parts of the earnings. In 2002 the personal taxation of dividends was again
removed. For foreign investors, dividends distributed from a Norwegian tax resident public
or private limited company to its non-resident shareholders are subject to 25% withholding
tax. Tax treaties may make the withholding tax deductible in the shareholder’s home
country. Non-resident shareholders gain on a sale of shares in a Norwegian company
is not subject to any Norwegian taxation, unless the shares form part of a permanent
establishment in Norway or the seller is an individual who fulﬁll certain conditions that
would make the gains taxable at a rate of 28%.
With respect to the relative tax treatment of dividends and repurchases in Norway,
there has been a change during our sample period from 1999 through 2001. In 1999 and
29labor unions, non-proﬁt organizations and public pension funds are exempt from taxation.
30RISK is the acronym for ”Regulering av Inngangsverdien med Skattlagt Kapital”. Translated, it means
that there is an adjustment of the cost basis by the retained earnings after corporate tax. To be eligible
to the RISK adjustment within a given year, the shareholder must have owned the shares over the turn of
the year.
31The Norwegian tax system is a full imputation system, in which a double taxation is eliminated. In
the UK, there is a partial imputation system, while the US has a classical company tax system.
152000, dividend distributions were not taxed. On the other hand repurchases where the
shareholder sells shares above the tax basis is taxed at 28%. Thus, in cases where the
ﬁrm uses already taxed earnings for repurchasing shares at a price above the tax basis,
the shareholder that sell shares back to the ﬁrm would experience a double taxation on
the excess capital gains. In 2001, when a dividend tax of 11% was introduced, the tax
diﬀerential between capital gains and dividends was reduced, favoring repurchases.32 With
respect to foreign investors, they have been subject to 25% withholding tax on dividends
through the entire sample period. However, since the capital gains for foreigners is subject
to the tax in the home country, the preference between dividends and repurchases may
vary between foreign investors depending on the tax treatment in their home country.
4 Data description and general statistics
The repurchase data
The sample was formed by collecting all the announcements of open market share re-
purchase programs for the period 1998 through 2001. In addition, the actual repurchase
executions related to these announcements reported to the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE)
from January 1999 through December 2001 were collected.33 Panel A of table 1 shows
statistics for repurchase plan announcements for the whole sample period as well as sepa-
rate years for our repurchase sample. The second column in panel A shows the number of
repurchase plans announced and the second column shows the number of separate ﬁrms
that announced. Thus, through the sample there were 318 repurchase plans announced
by 163 diﬀerent ﬁrms. This is about 55% of the ﬁrms that were listed on the OSE during
the sample period. The fourth column report the maximum number of announcements
for the whole period and separate years. The ﬁrm that announced the largest number
of times during the sample period announced once every year. Within each year, no
ﬁrms announced more than once in 1998 and 1999, while there was at least one ﬁrm that
announced twice during 2000 and 2001. The next three columns in panel A report the
minimum, average and maximum amount authorized to be repurchased during the repur-
chase period. For the whole period, the minimum amount announced by a ﬁrm was 1%
of the outstanding shares at announcement. The average amount announced was 9.5%
while the maximum was 10%, which also the upper legal limit. The median announcement
was for 10%, and 281 of the announcements was for 10% of the outstanding shares in the
ﬁrm. Thus, the default amount announced seemed to be the maximum legal limit.34 The
last 5 columns of panel A in table 1 shows the number of announcing ﬁrms that actually
bought shares during the repurchase period, the number of announcing ﬁrms that did not
execute any repurchases, the median, mean and maximum fraction of outstanding shares
repurchased during the announced repurchase periods. For the whole period there were
100 ﬁrms that actually executed at least one repurchase during the course of the program,
while 63 ﬁrms did not. For the separate years, the number of repurchasing ﬁrms reﬂect the
number of ﬁrms that announced a repurchase plan in the respective year, and repurchased
32The dividend taxation was removed again in 2002.
33Firms could announce a repurchase plan before 1999, but were not allowed to execute any repurchase
before January 1999.
34Several ﬁrms does not state a limit on the shares to be repurchased. In those cases, we assume that
the legal limit of 10% apply. However, ﬁrms are not required to announce the size of their programs, such
that these numbers may be too high relative to their intentions.
16shares during the announced repurchase period (with a maximum length of 18 months).
Thus, of the 85 ﬁrms that announced a repurchase plan in 1999, 41 ﬁrms executed at
least one repurchase, while 44 did not. For the ﬁrms that actually repurchased shares,
the median amount of outstanding shares repurchased was 1.8% while the mean amount
was 2.9%. The maximum amount repurchased was 22.1% which is more than twice the
legal limit of 10%. The maximum legal limit is exceeded by a few ﬁrms in every year in
the sample except for repurchases related to announcements in 1998. This may be due
a renewal of some repurchase plans which is not captured in our announcement records.
In addition, it may be because these ﬁrms have used repurchased shares as payments
in transactions, bonus plans to employees or managers or simply reduced the number of
outstanding shares such that their holding of treasury shares is kept below 10% at any
point in time, but that the accumulated repurchases exceeds the limit. Overall, the table
shows that the ﬁrst years after repurchases were introduced in Norway, there has been a
large increase in the number of ﬁrms announcing that they have initiated a repurchase
program. Of these ﬁrms, about 60% actually executed repurchases.
Panel B of table 1 shows statistics for the actual repurchase activity by the ﬁrms in our
sample for the whole sample period as well as for separate years. The second column in
panel B report the total number of executed repurchases, while the third to sixth column
report the cross-sectional distribution for the number of repurchases, column seven and
eight show the average repurchase size in number of shares and Norwegian kroner (NOK),
while the two last columns provide numbers for the total repurchase volume in shares
and NOK. The median ﬁrm executed 10 repurchases through the sample period while the
average number of repurchases across ﬁrms was almost 17. The ﬁrm that repurchased the
most, executed 197 repurchases through our sample period.35 For the separate years, the
number of repurchases more than tripled from 1999 to 2001, while it decreased in 2002.
On the other hand, the average number of repurchases across ﬁrms doubled through the
period. One interesting thing to note about the trend in repurchases is that there was
that the repurchase volume was the highest in 2001, both with respect to the number
of repurchases, the total number of shares repurchased as well as the NOK value of all
repurchases. One reason behind this may be that there was introduced an 11% personal
tax on dividends in 2001. However, a large amount of the repurchases in 2001 was also
triggered due to the large price drop in September 2001 after the terrorist attacks in the
US, as about 20% of the repurchases in 2001 was executed in September.
With respect to the size of the repurchases, the average size in number of shares in-
creased from 1999 to 2001 and decreased in 2002, while the size in Norwegian kroner
(NOK) steadily decreased through the period. This may indicate that ﬁrms that expe-
rienced a decline in their stock price repurchased more, wile ﬁrms with a high price or
that experienced an increase in their price repurchased less. With respect to the two last
columns in the table, we see that the number of shares in all repurchases tripled from
1999 to 2001, and fell in 2002. The same trend is evident when looking at the aggregate
volume of repurchases in NOK.
35The speciﬁc ﬁrm is Pan Fish ASA (PAN). The company is engaged in the farming, processing, sale
and distribution of salmon and trout at a global level. It has more than 2300 employees and operations in












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The ownership dataset was obtained from the Norwegian Central Securities Depository
(Verdipapirsentralen, VPS), and contains detailed monthly data on the ownership of ﬁrms
listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange spanning the same period as our repurchase data,
1999-2001.36 More speciﬁcally, for each month, the data contain variables describing the
ownership structure of each ﬁrm with respect to the number of shares owned by each owner,
the number of owners, and the type of owners (state, foreigners, ﬁnancials, nonﬁnancials
and individuals).
We also use data on insider ownership. The insider data is constructed based on the
reports published by the OSE when an insider trades in company stock. The disclosure
rules at the OSE state that an primary insider is required to report any transactions to
the OSE within 10 am the next day. This report contains the insider’s name, position,
number of shares transacted and the resulting total holding which makes it possible to
estimate the stake held by primary insiders. One important problem with the insider data
is that insiders who leave the ﬁrm has no obligation to report this event to the OSE.
Thus, when tracking the insider ownership fractions in ﬁrms, we are unable to remove
insiders that are no longer insiders. Thus, the insider ownership is potentially overstated
due to this. With respect to price and accounting data, we obtained this from OBI.37 This
data contain daily stock prices (at the close with best bid and ask prices) and adjustment
factors (for dividends, stock splits etc.).
To give a general overview of the ownership structure for ﬁrms listed at the OSE for
the period we are studying, table 2 report some general statistics across time and market
capitalization quartiles. In part (a) of the table we report statistics for the number of
listed ﬁrms, the average market capitalization, market/book, price and dividend payment
(per share) for the whole sample and for separate years. With respect to the number of
ﬁrms, these numbers are higher than the oﬃcial ”end of year” number reported by the
OSE. This is due to new listings, de-listings, mergers and de-mergers occurring within
each year.38 Overall, the average market capitalization increased through the period from
NOK 2.3 bill. to NOK 3.4 bill, while the total market capitalization of all listed ﬁrms
increased from NOK 582 bill. in 1999 to NOK 677 bill. in 2001.39 The average market-
to-book value was 1.15 for all ﬁrms through the sample period. Across MCAP quartiles,
the market-to-book value was 1.2 for the ﬁrms with a market capitalization below the
median and 1.1 for the above median ﬁrms. Further, the average cash dividend per share
was the lowest in 1999, with NOK 6.1 per share, and the highest in 2000 with NOK 7.6
per share. The total cash dividends paid by all ﬁrms for the period was NOK 40 bill.,
distributed across years as NOK 14 bill. in 1999, NOK 12 bill in 2000 and NOK 14 bill. in
2001.40 Thus, despite the increased tax on dividends in 2001, this did not seem to aﬀect
the average or aggregate dividend payments by Norwegian ﬁrms.
In part (b) of table 2 we summarize the average ownership fraction by each of the
ﬁve largest owners. In addition, the average total fraction owned by the 5 largest owners
combined and the Herﬁndahl index is reported. The ﬁrst thing to note about the table is
36The ownership data actually covers a longer period. For a monthly frequency, the ownership data
starts in 1997 through 2002. For end of year data, the ownership data goes back to 1989.
37Oslo Børsinformasjon
38The oﬃcial number companies listed at the OSE at the end of each year was 215 (1999), 214 (2000),
212 (2001), 203 (2002).
39In 2002 the total market capitalization of the OSE fell to NOK 503 bill.
40In 2002 Norwegian ﬁrms paid out more than NOK 19 bill. in dividends.
19Table 2: Ownership concentration and insider ownership at the OSE
Part (a) of the table shows some general statistics for the listed ﬁrms at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE)
across the whole sample period, separate years and market capitalization quartiles. The number of ﬁrms
also contain de-listed and ﬁrms that are listed during the sample period. Thus, this number is larger than
the number of listed ﬁrms at oﬃcially reported by the Oslo Stock Exchange at the end of the year. The
average market capitalization, Market/Book and price are monthly averages across ﬁrms. The dividend
per share is the average dividend paid by ﬁrms across the whole sample period or within each calendar year.
Part (b) of the table shows the mean and median fraction owned by the ﬁve largest owners separately, the
mean and median accumulated fraction owned by the ﬁve largest owners as well as the Herﬁndahl index.
Part (c) of the table shows the mean and median fraction owned by all insiders in the ﬁrm and the primary
insiders (board members and management team). Note that we only have insider data until June 2001.
Separate years Market capitalization quartiles
All years 1999 2000 2001 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
(a) General statistics
Firm/year obs. 301 271 261 245 75 75 75 75
MCAP (mill.NOK) 3112 2326 2818 3353 93 354 1106 11394
Market/Book 1.15 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
Price 76.0 81.6 92.3 71.2 61.2 51.0 91.4 132.0
Dividend/share 6.5 6.1 7.6 7.1 8.6 7.1 8.0 5.1
(b) Ownership concentration
Largest owner
mean 0.326 0.308 0.318 0.306 0.259 0.299 0.315 0.293
stddev 0.236 0.232 0.253 0.238 0.180 0.235 0.219 0.223
median 0.243 0.226 0.230 0.240 0.236 0.222 0.212 0.213
2nd largest
mean 0.103 0.106 0.101 0.108 0.107 0.104 0.106 0.098
stddev 0.067 0.071 0.072 0.075 0.056 0.075 0.065 0.066
median 0.090 0.091 0.085 0.094 0.097 0.094 0.094 0.080
3rd largest
mean 0.060 0.063 0.059 0.061 0.065 0.062 0.062 0.057
stddev 0.034 0.037 0.036 0.042 0.031 0.039 0.034 0.034
median 0.053 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.059 0.057 0.056 0.048
4th largest
mean 0.042 0.044 0.041 0.042 0.048 0.042 0.045 0.040
stddev 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.019
median 0.041 0.042 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.039
5th largest
mean 0.032 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.032
stddev 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.014
median 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.032 0.032
Sum 5 largest
mean 0.563 0.555 0.551 0.549 0.515 0.540 0.562 0.520
stddev 0.229 0.234 0.243 0.240 0.208 0.240 0.231 0.212
median 0.557 0.557 0.552 0.558 0.557 0.550 0.554 0.454
Herﬁndahl index
mean 0.206 0.187 0.201 0.184 0.130 0.181 0.187 0.170
stddev 0.228 0.218 0.250 0.232 0.146 0.226 0.201 0.203
median 0.099 0.095 0.098 0.103 0.096 0.096 0.099 0.081
(c) Insider ownership
All insiders
mean 0.136 0.144 0.149 0.146 0.153 0.171 0.155 0.139
stddev 0.253 0.264 0.273 0.269 0.279 0.287 0.262 0.266
median 0.011 0.005 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.024 0.013
Primary insiders
mean 0.079 0.081 0.085 0.089 0.100 0.103 0.095 0.054
stddev 0.192 0.198 0.210 0.216 0.241 0.239 0.215 0.122
median 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002
Data from all listed ﬁrms at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over the period 1999-2002. Data source: Verdipa-
pirsentralen (VPS). 20that the average ownership fraction each of the largest owners has been relatively constant
through the period, with the largest owner owning about 33% on average. In addition,
the ﬁve largest owners decreased their mean ownership from 55.5% in 1999 to 54.9% in
2001, while the median ownership by the ﬁve largest owners remained unchanged. These
numbers are similar to what is found in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) for 1997 when the
average stake for the largest owner was 29%, and the total ownership by the ﬁve largest
owners was 53%. However, relative to their study, the stake of the largest owner has
increased by 1.8 percentage points from 1997 to 1999, wile the aggregate ownership of
the ﬁve largest owners increased by 2.5 percentage points. Compared to what is common
among European ﬁrms the ownership by the largest owners is very low in Norway. Bøhren
and Ødegaard (2001) report that the average ownership by the largest owner for European
countries in 1997 was 44%. When looking at the Herﬁndahl index,41 this measure suggests
that there was an increase in concentration from 1999 to 2000, and a decrease in concen-
tration from 2000 to 2001. However, the median concentration has increased through the
period. For 1997 Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) report an average Herﬁndahl index of 0.15.
Across market capitalizations, the most evident pattern is that the mean fraction owned
by the ﬁve largest owners is the largest in ﬁrms with a market capitalization in the sec-
ond and third quartile. This is also evident when looking at the Herﬁndahl index. With
respect to the ownership of each of the largest owners across market capitalizations, the
average ownership is generally the highest for ﬁrms in the third size quartile. However,
the median ownership is the largest in the lowest size quartile.
In part (c) of table 2 we report similar statistics for the fraction owned by insiders in
ﬁrms listed on the OSE. Before we continue, it should be noted that we only have insider
data until the ﬁrst half of 2001. For the entire sample period, all insiders owned about
14% in Norwegian ﬁrms on average, while primary insiders (the management team and
board members) owned on average about 8%. Comparably, Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001)
report that all insiders owned on average 10% in 1997 while primary insiders owned about
3%. Thus, relative to their numbers, there has been an increase in the insider ownership
at the OSE. However, some caution should be used when interpreting these numbers since
the larger insider fractions in this study may be because of the data problem related to the
insider holdings discussed earlier. With respect to the median insider, all insiders owned
about 1.1%, while primary insiders owned about 0.1%. Thus the distribution of inside
ownership is highly skewed. This is caused by a large part of the sample ﬁrms having a
very low or a close to zero fraction owned by insiders of the ﬁrm, in addition to several
ﬁrms having a very high insiders ownership. Furthermore, across market capitalization
quartiles, the average insider ownership is the highest in the lowest size quartiles.
5 Descriptive analysis of ownership in repurchasing ﬁrms
In this section we combine the data on announcements of repurchase plans, actual repur-
chases and the ownership data to examine whether there are diﬀerences in the ownership
composition in announcing versus non-announcing ﬁrms. In addition, we examine whether
ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares during the repurchase period and those that do not
are diﬀerent from ﬁrms that do not announce a repurchase plan. To facilitate this, we
41The Herﬁndahl index is calculated as the sum of squared ownership fractions of all owners in a ﬁrm.
The Herﬁndahl index is highly correlated (more than 0.8) with the aggregate ownership of the ﬁve largest
owners.
21split all the ﬁrms at the OSE into 4 subgroups. When looking at the whole sample pe-
riod, the ﬁrst group consists of all ﬁrms that do not announce a repurchase plan during
our sample period from 1999 through 2001. The second group consists of ﬁrms that do
announce at least one repurchase plan during our sample period. The third group consists
of ﬁrms that announce a repurchase plan, but do not repurchase any shares during the
repurchase period, and the fourth group consists of announcing ﬁrms that actually execute
repurchases during the repurchase period.42 Similarly, when looking at separate years, we
split ﬁrms into groups based on whether they have announced a repurchase plan or not
during the respective year. To determine whether a ﬁrm has repurchased any shares after
it has announced within in a speciﬁc year, we track whether it has repurchased within the
announced time limit, or within the legal limit of 18 months. For example, a ﬁrm that
announces a repurchase plan in May of 1999 is considered a repurchasing ﬁrm (for that
year) if it executes at least one repurchase before December 2000.
5.1 Ownership concentration in repurchasing ﬁrms
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), among others, suggest that
ownership concentration is an important mechanism for disciplining and monitoring non-
owner managers. This because large outside owners potentially both have the incentives
to monitor through high cash ﬂow rights as well as the power to aﬀect corporate decisions
through their voting rights. If there are no large shareholders with these incentives, there
may be insuﬃcient monitoring of managers. In those cases, payout policy is one mechanism
that can help reduce the agency problems as suggested by Jensen (1986). Although cash
dividends and new debt also reduce the amount of free cash within a ﬁrm, more ﬂexible
repurchases may be especially attractive for ﬁrms with volatile cash ﬂows that want to
smooth dividends.
In this section we examine the ownership concentration of repurchasing ﬁrms to investi-
gate whether ﬁrms with potentially higher agency problems tend to use more repurchases.
Table 3 shows the concentration statistics across ﬁrm-groups for the whole period as well
as for separate years. We do not distinguish between voting and non-voting shares in
any part of the analysis, but instead calculate the statistics at the company level.43 We
calculate average statistics for the groups discussed above, where “All OSE ﬁrms” are all
listed ﬁrms at the OSE. These ﬁrms are further divided into “Non-announcing ﬁrms” and
“Announcing ﬁrms” depending on whether the ﬁrm has announced a repurchase plan dur-
ing the sample period or not. The “Announcing ﬁrms” group is then further divided into
two sub-groups depending on whether the ﬁrms have executed any repurchases during the
repurchase period (“Repurchase”) or not (“No repurchase”). The second column in the
table report the number of ﬁrms in each group and sub-group.44 Column three to seven
show the average fraction owned by the largest (ranking 1) to the ﬁfth largest (ranking 5)
owner. The eight and ninth column report the ownership concentration measures which
is the combined fraction owned by the 5 largest owners and the Herﬁndahl index respec-
tively. Finally, the three last columns report the average market capitalization (in NOK
42The repurchase period is the period for which the ﬁrm has announced that it may repurchase shares.
The maximum legal limit is 18 months.
43Only 13 ﬁrms had non-voting (B-shares) shares at the end of 1999. During the sample period, many
ﬁrms chose to merge these together into a single share-class.
44Note that the number of ﬁrms within each group is lower than in table 1. This is because the numbers
are at company level, which reduces the number of observations with about 10.
22mill.), the average dividend (in NOK per share) paid out by the ﬁrms, and the market
to book value. We run tests for diﬀerences in means between the group of announc-
ing ﬁrms and non-announcing ﬁrms. In addition, for the two subgroups of repurchasing
and non-repurchasing ﬁrms we run a test for diﬀerences in means against the group of
non-announcing ﬁrms. Thus, all tests are relative to the non-announcing group.45
Looking at the statistics for the whole period ﬁrst, there are several things to note.
The largest owner has a signiﬁcantly lower stake in announcing ﬁrms (30%) than in non-
announcing ﬁrms (43%). On the other hand, the second- to ﬁfth largest owners owns a
signiﬁcantly larger fraction in announcing ﬁrms than in non-announcing ﬁrms. This is
also reﬂected in the concentration measure in column eight (“Sum 5 largest”), where we
see that the average fraction owned by the ﬁve largest owners is signiﬁcantly lower in
announcing ﬁrms than in ﬁrms that do not announce a repurchase plan. This diﬀerence
is mainly due to the lower ownership by the largest owner in these ﬁrms. With respect
to the Herﬁndahl index the diﬀerence becomes even more pronounced. When examining
the group of announcing ﬁrms in more detail, we see that the diﬀerences in ownership
concentration is the largest for ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares. Looking at the
fraction owned by the ﬁve largest shareholders together, we see that while the ﬁrms that
announce, but do not repurchase has on average a combined ownership of about 58%
which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from ﬁrms that do not announce a repurchase plan
(63%). However, ﬁrms that announce and repurchase has a combined ownership of about
53%, which is signiﬁcantly lower than the group of non-announcing ﬁrms. This is also
evident when looking at the Herﬁndahl index. However, relative to that measure, both
repurchasing and non repurchasing ﬁrms have a signiﬁcantly lower concentration. For the
separate years, the diﬀerences seem to be more pronounced in the last part of the sample,
except for the ownership of the largest owner and the Herﬁndahl index.
These ﬁndings is in line with a story where ﬁrms with dispersed ownership have greater
incentives to initiate a self-disciplinary mechanism to ensure their shareholders that they
are committed to mitigate agency costs of free cash. This because the largest shareholder
also has potentially lower incentives to monitor management, as well as less power to
intervene, compared to non-announcing ﬁrms where the largest shareholders own a signif-
icantly higher fraction of the ﬁrm. In addition, the shareholders in these ﬁrms may also
be more likely to support a proposal that the ﬁrm wants to initiate a repurchase program
if it is expected to reduce agency costs.
Furthermore, the results also suggest that these diﬀerences in concentration is the
strongest in ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares. This results may however also be in
line with managers using repurchases to reduce the probability of a successful hostile
takeover, and aim at increasing the ownership concentration over time in the hands of
themselves and/or the most “manager-loyal” shareholders. In addition, as discussed ear-
lier, those shareholders selling their shares in the market would also be those with the
lowest valuations eﬀectively increasing the price to a bidder. This may indicate that ﬁrms
where the incentives to monitor are the lowest and the probability of a successful takeover
45The test depends on whether the population variances of the two groups are equal or not. If the
variances are equal, then the t-stat is calculated as t = (¯ xa − ¯ xb)/
p
s2(1/na + 1/nb) where ¯ xa and ¯ xb
are the means for the two groups respectively, na and nb are the number of ﬁrms in each group while s
2
is the pooled standard deviation calculated as s
2 = [(na − 1)s
2
a + (nb − 1)s
2





b are the standard deviation of the ownership variable for the non-announcing and announcing ﬁrms
respectively. We use the SAS v.8.2 package to perform all tests. If the variances are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24is the highest, are more likely to actually repurchase. We will also come back to this issue
when we later examine the number of owners in these ﬁrms.
The ﬁnding that the 2nd-5th largest owners have a higher ownership fraction in an-
nouncing ﬁrms seem to be the case both for non-repurchasing and repurchasing ﬁrms.
This indicates that announcing ﬁrms have a ﬂatter power structure than non-announcing
ﬁrms. Furthermore, dispersion in ownership among the largest shareholders is even more
pronounced in ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares. In non-announcing ﬁrms, the largest
shareholder has about 2 times the stake of the combined ownership of the 2nd-5th largest
owners, while this ratio is 1.5 in ﬁrms that announce a repurchase plan, and closer to 1 in
ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares indicating that the largest owner has a similar stake
as the 2nd-5th owners combined. The diﬀerence between announcing and non-announcing
ﬁrms may reﬂect that it is easier to obtain enough votes for initiating a repurchase plan in
these ﬁrms than in non-announcing ﬁrms in the sense that it would be more diﬃcult for a
large shareholder to block a proposal of a repurchase program when his relative ownership
is low. With respect to why ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares has the ﬂattest struc-
ture, this may reﬂect that managers have stronger incentives to actually repurchase shares
in these ﬁrms. For example, the manager may beneﬁt from concentrating the ownership in
these ﬁrms to reduce the probability of experiencing a successful takeover. Alternatively,
it may also reﬂect that managers in fact are committed to distribute excess cash in ﬁrms
with the potentially highest agency costs.
With respect to the size of the ﬁrms in the diﬀerent groups, there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in market capitalization between announcing and non-announcing ﬁrms for the
whole sample or separate years. Also with respect to dividends, the diﬀerence is only
signiﬁcant at the 10% level for the whole sample period. For the separate years however,
ﬁrms that announced repurchase plans paid signiﬁcantly lower dividends both in 1999
and 2001, but not in 2000. Looking at the subgroups of announcing ﬁrms within each
year, ﬁrms that actually repurchased shares paid signiﬁcantly lower dividends than non-
announcing ﬁrms within each year. This is what one would expect to see if ﬁrms substitute
repurchases for dividends as suggested by Grullon and Michaely (2002). In addition, for
announcing ﬁrms that did not repurchase, the lower dividend payments may be explained
by these ﬁrms being less liquid, and thus less likely to pay either dividends or repurchase
shares.46 In addition, as discussed earlier in the paper, an 11% dividend tax was introduced
in 2001. This does not seem to have an impact on the average dividend payment by ﬁrms.
With respect to the market to book values, these are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for ﬁrms
in any of the groups.
Overall, there seem to be systematic diﬀerences in the ownership concentration of
ﬁrms that initiate a repurchase program relative to ﬁrms that do not. Repurchasing ﬁrms
generally have a much lower concentration and a ﬂatter power structure between the
ﬁve largest owners. This may support several theories. One interpretation may be that
these ﬁrms may suﬀer from insuﬃcient monitoring such that a repurchase plan is used
to mitigate agency problems related to free cash. In addition, shareholders in these ﬁrms
may be more likely to vote for a repurchase program if they believe this will help mitigate
agency problems when there is insuﬃcient monitoring. However, it may be diﬃcult to
force a manager to actually repurchase shares if he prefers to keep cash within the ﬁrm.
On the other hand, as suggested by Isagawa (2000), if managers have a stake in the ﬁrm,
46In a previous paper on repurchases in Norway, we ﬁnd that announcing ﬁrms that do not repurchase
shares has a signiﬁcantly lower quick ratio and current ratio than ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares.
25through share ownership or stock options, it may be optimal for them to disgorge excess
cash through repurchases instead of investing in negative net present value projects that
would decrease the value of the ﬁrm in the long run. Another interesting ﬁnding is that
ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares have a much ﬂatter power structure among the ﬁve
largest owners compared to any other group. This may suggest that managers have the
strongest incentives to actually execute repurchases in ﬁrms with low concentration.
5.2 Ownership by owner-types and number of owners in repurchasing
ﬁrms
The type of owner may also have important implications for the corporate governance of a
ﬁrm. As discussed in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), agency theory predicts that personal
owners are better monitorers than non-personal owners such as other corporations or
the state. This because, personal owners have direct private cash ﬂow interests, while
non-personal owners, being an agent representing the ultimate owner, do not. Thus, the
incentives for monitoring management may be stronger for personal owners. On the other
hand, personal owners are generally much smaller, and has less power in aﬀecting the
decisions unless they co-ordinate their interests. In addition, it may be that some types of
owners that have a stronger preference for one type of payout policy due to e.g. tax reasons.
As suggested in Brav et al. (2003), executives do not believe that institutional investors
have a preference between dividends or repurchases, but that personal shareholders have
a preference towards dividends despite the tax disadvantage to this payout method in
the US. On the other hand, their study suggest that institutions often have an important
inﬂuence with respect to initiating a repurchase program.
In this section we examine the ownership by diﬀerent owner types both with respect
to their proportional ownership as well as to the number of owners by diﬀerent types.
Our dataset has information on 5 main types of owners; State owners that represent in-
vestments by the central or local government, foreign owners47 which reﬂect ownership by
non-resident organizations or individuals, ﬁnancial owners reﬂects institutional ownership
such as private banks, insurance ﬁrms, pension funds and investment trusts, Nonﬁnancial
owners are domestic ﬁrms, and individuals which are Norwegian personal investors.
In table 4 we calculate the average ownership fractions owned by these owner-types
for the same groups that we used in the previous section. For all ﬁrms at the OSE, the
largest average owner is non-ﬁnancial, which is also the result in Bøhren and Ødegaard
(2001). With respect to the diﬀerence in ownership fraction between announcing and non-
announcing ﬁrms, there are only two types that have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ownership
in announcing ﬁrms for the whole period. These are foreigners which has a signiﬁcantly
lower stake in announcing ﬁrms, while non-ﬁnancial owners has a signiﬁcantly higher stake
in announcing ﬁrms. In both cases this is mainly due to their ownership in ﬁrms that
actually execute repurchases. In addition, the diﬀerence is strongest for ﬁrms announcing
and repurchasing in the beginning of the sample.
Whether these diﬀerences are because certain ownertypes has a preference for or
against repurchases, or that ﬁrms with these types of owners initiate repurchases is diﬃcult
to say. However, one may speculate that one reason for this might be that foreign owners
are mutual funds or other foreign investors that are invested in Norway for diversiﬁcation
reasons. As we saw in table 3 for the whole sample period, announcing ﬁrms seemed
47The number of foreign owners is understated because it contain both registered individuals as well as
nominee accounts which may reﬂect several diﬀerent owners.
26Table 4: Ownership by owner types for repurchasing vs. non-repurchasing ﬁrms
The table shows the average ownership fraction for 5 diﬀerent types of owners. We split ﬁrms into ﬁve
groups. “All OSE ﬁrms” are all ﬁrms listed on the OSE. These ﬁrms are divided into two groups. The
ﬁrst group is “Non announcing ﬁrms” containing all ﬁrms listed at the OSE that does not announce a
repurchase plan during our sample period. The second group is “Announcing ﬁrms” which consists of
ﬁrms that announce a repurchase plan. This group is further divided into ﬁrms that announce, but do not
repurchase any shares (“No repurchase”) and ﬁrms that announce and repurchase shares (“Repurchase”).
Tests for diﬀerences in means between the diﬀerent groups of announcing ﬁrms are performed relative to





Ownership fraction by type
Non-
Firm group Firm/year State Foreign Financial ﬁnancial Individual
Whole period
All OSE ﬁrms 301 0.043 0.210 0.165 0.373 0.206
Non announcing ﬁrms 152 0.045 0.239 0.159 0.336 0.216
Announcing ﬁrms 149 0.042 0.180∗∗ 0.172 0.411∗∗ 0.196
-No repurchase 54 0.029 0.208 0.181 0.400 0.184
-Repurchase 95 0.049 0.164∗∗∗ 0.166 0.418∗∗∗ 0.203
Year 1999
All OSE ﬁrms 271 0.041 0.201 0.166 0.368 0.222
Non announcing ﬁrms 193 0.038 0.217 0.165 0.339 0.235
Announcing ﬁrms 78 0.049 0.159∗∗ 0.202∗ 0.404∗∗ 0.187∗∗
-No repurchase 39 0.053 0.177 0.224∗∗ 0.375 0.173∗∗
-Repurchase 39 0.045 0.141∗∗∗ 0.181 0.433∗∗ 0.201
Year 2000
All OSE ﬁrms 261 0.041 0.202 0.166 0.370 0.223
Non announcing ﬁrms 181 0.025 0.245 0.227 0.305 0.203
Announcing ﬁrms 80 0.061 0.181 0.169 0.379 0.211
-No repurchase 20 0.036 0.204 0.159∗∗ 0.374 0.228
-Repurchase 60 0.052 0.197 0.184 0.361 0.209
Year 2001
All OSE ﬁrms 245 0.043 0.203 0.154 0.378 0.222
Non announcing ﬁrms 145 0.047 0.203 0.150 0.359 0.243
Announcing ﬁrms 100 0.039 0.203 0.161 0.406 0.193∗∗
-No repurchase 47 0.049 0.231 0.170 0.370 0.182∗∗
-Repurchase 53 0.030 0.178 0.153 0.438∗∗ 0.203
to have a slightly smaller (although insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent) market capitalization than
non-announcing ﬁrms. If foreign investors are tracking the value weighted return on the
OSE, they are also likely to be invested in the largest ﬁrms on the exchange. A potential
reason for why nonﬁnancial owners has a greater stake in repurchasing ﬁrms may be that
some ﬁrms use their repurchased shares (treasury shares) as payment in transactions with
other ﬁrms. In addition, the reason may simply be that the treasury stock is captured in
this measure such that the numbers also reﬂect that ﬁrms own their own stock.48
Another statistic that represent an alternative measure of concentration is the number
of owners. One problem with the average ownership fraction by diﬀerent owner types,
48We do not examine in what degree the ﬁrms own stock contribute to the diﬀerence. Since the owners in
the VPS data are anonymized and represented by a unique number, it is diﬃcult to remove the repurchasing
ﬁrms own shareholdings.
27examined in table 4, is that it may to a large degree capture the ownership by the largest
owners of a type. The number of owners by diﬀerent owner types may give additional
information with respect to the preferences of diﬀerent shareholder groups. In table 5 we
examine the average number of owners by owner type across the diﬀerent ﬁrm groups as
well as the mean total number of owners. Compared to the previous table there are a
few interesting things to note. First of all, ﬁrms that announce a repurchase plan seem
to have a larger number of owners than ﬁrms that do not announce a plan. However, the
diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant when looking at the total number of owners. This is mainly
because the cross sectional variation in these numbers are very large. Also when testing
for diﬀerences in medians there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between announcing and non-
announcing ﬁrms.49 However, the diﬀerence seem to be mainly due to those ﬁrms that
actually execute repurchases, which on average had more than 4000 owners, while non-
announcing ﬁrms had about 2400 owners.
Initially one could expect there to be a higher number of owners in repurchasing ﬁrms.
First, a greater number of owners in announcing ﬁrms is expected in the sense that we
found that the ownership concentration is lower in these ﬁrms. Thus, one explanation
discussed before could be that dispersed ownership result in insuﬃcient monitoring, such
that ﬁrms initiate repurchases to distribute cash and mitigate the agency costs of cash.
However, a high number of potentially small owners may also be a reason for why ﬁrms
want to repurchase shares in the ﬁrst place. For example, by reducing the number of
owners, and increasing the concentration, the ﬁrm may improve the external monitoring of
the ﬁrm by increasing the proportional ownership of some owners, or reduce the likelihood
of a successful takeover. In addition, some ﬁrms in Norway explicitly state that they
intended to repurchase shares to remove “odd-lot” owners.50 Compared to the results when
we examined the fraction owned by each owner-type, some additional patterns appear.
The average number of owners of all types, except individuals, is signiﬁcantly higher in
announcing ﬁrms.
Overall, the number of state owners, foreigners, ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial owners is
signiﬁcantly higher in announcing ﬁrms. This reﬂects the ﬁnding that ﬁrms that announce
repurchase plans have a lower concentration than non-announcing ﬁrms. Furthermore, the
diﬀerences are the largest in ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares, which may be a strong
motivation for why these ﬁrms repurchase shares.
5.3 Insider ownership in repurchasing ﬁrms
One very important owner is the insider which is potentially better informed about current
earnings and the future prospects of the ﬁrm. In addition, although the general stockholder
meeting has voted for initiating a repurchase plan, the manager is the one that decides if
and when to execute repurchases. Agency theory predicts that a ﬁrm with a large outside
shareholder may help mitigate agency costs through his incentives to monitor and power
to intervene in the decision process. Similarly, when the manager has a stake in the ﬁrm,
the agency problem may also be lower as there is a convergence of interest (Jensen and
49The median number of owners in non-announcing ﬁrms is 816, while it is 1473 for announcing ﬁrms
for the whole sample period.
50One example of this is Storebrand (STB) which at the beginning January 1999 gave an oﬀer to
shareholders that owned less than 8 shares to sell their shares back to the company. Of the total 74000
shareholders at the time, 39000 owned less than 8 shares. Since this is a targeted repurchase it is left out
of the analysis, since we only examine open market repurchases.
28Table 5: Number of owners by owner type for repurchasing vs. non-repurchasing ﬁrms
The table shows the average number of owners for 5 diﬀerent types of owners. We split ﬁrms into ﬁve
groups. “All OSE ﬁrms” are all ﬁrms listed on the OSE. These ﬁrms are divided into two groups. The
ﬁrst group is “Non announcing ﬁrms” containing all ﬁrms listed at the OSE that does not announce a
repurchase plan during our sample period. The second group is “Announcing ﬁrms” which consists of
ﬁrms that announce a repurchase plan. This group is further divided into ﬁrms that announce, but do not
repurchase any shares (“No repurchase”) and ﬁrms that announce and repurchase shares (“Repurchase”).
Tests for diﬀerences in means between the diﬀerent groups of announcing ﬁrms are performed relative to





Average number of owners
Non-
Firm group Firms All State Foreign Financial ﬁnancial Individual
Whole period
All OSE ﬁrms 301 2901 4 131 43 159 2564
Non announcing ﬁrms 152 2371 3 79 32 118 2138
Announcing ﬁrms 149 3443 6∗∗ 185∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 201∗∗∗ 2998
-No repurchase 54 2136 4 143 48∗∗∗ 168∗∗ 1773
-Repurchase 95 4185∗ 7∗∗∗ 208∗∗∗ 57∗∗∗ 219∗∗∗ 3695∗
Year 1999
All OSE ﬁrms 271 2813 4 137 44 171 2456
Non announcing ﬁrms 193 2274 3 114 37 143 1976
Announcing ﬁrms 78 4147∗∗ 6∗∗ 196∗ 60∗∗∗ 240∗∗∗ 3645∗∗
-No repurchase 39 2142 4 149 53∗ 178 1758
-Repurchase 39 6153∗∗ 8∗∗ 243∗ 67∗∗∗ 303∗∗∗ 5532∗∗
Year 2000
All OSE ﬁrms 261 2808 4 137 46 172 2447
Non announcing ﬁrms 181 2080 3 88 37 139 1813
Announcing ﬁrms 80 4454∗∗∗ 6∗∗ 250∗∗∗ 66∗∗∗ 248∗∗∗ 3884∗∗
-No repurchase 20 6865∗∗∗ 10∗∗∗ 448∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 361∗∗∗ 5959∗∗∗
-Repurchase 60 3650∗ 5∗ 183∗∗ 60∗∗ 210∗∗ 3192
Year 2001
All OSE ﬁrms 245 3328 6 156 47 175 2944
Non announcing ﬁrms 145 3320 5 114 40 157 3004
Announcing ﬁrms 100 3341 7 219∗∗ 58∗∗ 200 2858
-No repurchase 47 2441 5 173∗ 53 175 2035
-Repurchase 53 4139 8∗ 259∗ 62∗∗ 222∗ 3588
29Meckling, 1976) between the inside- and outside owners. However, as discussed in section
2, there may also be a conﬂict between inside- and outside owners. First of all, the manager
may not have any incentives to actually execute repurchases even though the shareholders
have voted for a repurchase plan. Alternatively, the manager may have incentives to secure
their position in the ﬁrm by increasing their ownership fraction (entrenchment) through
repurchasing. One example would be to resist hostile takeovers that, if successful, would
threaten their position in the ﬁrm and make them loose control over the ﬁrms resources.
As argued by Bagwell (1991) and others, a repurchase may be used as an eﬀective measure
to to reduce the probability of takeovers. For the outside owners, this would reduce their
wealth if the takeover is expected to be a valuable restructuring within the ﬁrm that could
lead to a more eﬃcient use of ﬁrm resources. As shown by Denis (1990) the price eﬀect for
a ﬁrm announcing a defensive repurchase is highly negative which suggests that defensive
repurchases are associated with losses for the shareholders of the target ﬁrm.
A large part of the literature also focus argue that insiders use repurchases to convey
private information to the market, and that this is a potential reason for why a positive
announcement eﬀect is observed. Ignoring the credibility issues related to announcements
motivated by undervaluation, discussed in Fried (2002) among others, one would expect
insiders to have a higher ownership in ﬁrms announcing a repurchase plan due to mispric-
ing, than ﬁrms that do not. Furthermore, in models by Brennan and Thakor (1990) and
Barclay and Smith (1988) the manager also use repurchases to increase his ownership in
an undervalued ﬁrm and thereby transfer wealth from uninformed shareholders to himself
and the remaining shareholders. The model in Isagawa (2000) more explicitly focus on
the credibility issues related of open market repurchase, and argue that when the man-
ager has stock options or own shares in the ﬁrm, it may be optimal for him to initiate
a repurchase program and substitute repurchases for dividends. The prediction of these
models is that ﬁrms with high insider ownership are more likely to initiate repurchases,
or that the insider ownership is expected to increase in undervalued ﬁrms. In line with
the predictions in Isagawa (2000), Li and McNally (2002) ﬁnd that repurchasing ﬁrms in
Canada have a higher insider ownership on average. In addition, Fenn and Liang (2001)
ﬁnd that repurchase activity is positively related to the amount of management options
in Canadian ﬁrms. They argue that their results suggest that managers use repurchases
to increase the value of these options by substituting repurchases for dividends.
Further, as argued by Fried (2002), managers motivation for repurchasing shares may
also be related to managerial opportunism. This in the sense that managers may want
to initiate an open market repurchase both when the ﬁrm is undervalued and overvalued,
which is in contrast to the undervaluation hypothesis where the managers want to initiate
a repurchase plan only in the cases when the ﬁrm is undervalued. Relative to the under-
valuation hypothesis, the manager opportunism hypothesis does not have any clear-cut
predictions with respect to the insider ownership in repurchasing ﬁrms unless these ﬁrms
are systematically undervalued.
To investigate these issues further, table 6 provide statistics on the average insider
ownership for all insiders as well as for primary insiders for the same groups of ﬁrms as
before. We ﬁnd a large diﬀerence in average insider ownership in ﬁrms that announce
a repurchase plan relative to non-announcing ﬁrms. On average for the whole sample
period, insiders in announcing ﬁrms own more than twice (20%) the fraction of insiders
in non-announcing ﬁrms (8%). This diﬀerence is also systematic and signiﬁcant for the
separate years. However, when we examine more closely the groups of announcing ﬁrms
that actually repurchase or not, some diﬀerences appear. The results suggests the ﬁrms
30Table 6: Ownership by insiders
The table shows descriptive statistics for the total and primary insider ownership across the same groups as
in table 3. The
∗,
∗∗ and
∗∗∗ denotes a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in means between the non-announcing ﬁrms and
the announcing ﬁrms at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. We also test whether the mean insider
ownership in the sub-groups of repurchasing/non-repurchasing ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
non-announcing ﬁrms. The test depends on whether the population variances of the two groups are equal
or not. If the variances are equal, then the t-stat is calculated as t = (¯ xa − ¯ xb)/
p
s2(1/na + 1/nb) where
¯ xa and ¯ xb are the means for the two groups respectively, na and nb are the number of ﬁrms in each group
while s














sample 1999 2000 2001
All insiders
All OSE ﬁrms 0.139 0.144 0.149 0.146
Non announcing ﬁrms 0.079 0.110 0.110 0.099
Announcing ﬁrms 0.199∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
-No repurchase 0.177∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.228∗ 0.109
-Repurchase 0.211∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
Primary insiders
All OSE ﬁrms 0.081 0.081 0.085 0.089
Non announcing ﬁrms 0.045 0.059 0.065 0.077
Announcing ﬁrms 0.115∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.105
-No repurchase 0.131∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.053
-Repurchase 0.106∗∗∗ 0.094 0.114∗ 0.151∗∗
that actually repurchase seem to have the highest total insider ownership of the two groups.
This may indicate that insiders retain their shares in repurchasing ﬁrms, increasing their
ownership proportion.
When looking at only the ownership by the primary insiders (managers and members
of the board), the results are similar for the whole sample period. Moreover, primary
own on average 11.5% in ﬁrms that initiate a repurchase program, but only 4.5% in non-
announcing ﬁrms. For the subgroups of announcing ﬁrms, primary insiders have a higher
ownership in ﬁrms that do not repurchase any shares, which is the opposite as the result
for all insiders. The diﬀerence becomes even more apparent when looking at the separate
years. We do not have a good explanation for this diﬀerence between primary insiders
and all insiders. When looking at separate years, the diﬀerence in primary ownership is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for announcing ﬁrms in 2001.
Relative to the diﬀerent models and hypotheses discussed earlier, this ﬁnding is consis-
tent both with mispricing, entrenchment, expropriation and the model of Isagawa (2000).
Relative to an agency story, where repurchases is used to mitigate agency costs, we would
expect to see a lower insider ownership in announcing ﬁrms. Thus, combined with the
ﬁndings earlier, where ﬁrms with low concentration and more dispersed ownership initiate
repurchase programs, the high insider stake may suggest that mitigation of agency costs
is a less important motivation for why ﬁrms repurchase. On the other hand, it might be
that both are important reasons for why ﬁrms initiate repurchase programs, but that this
diﬀer among ﬁrms.
31To further investigate the diﬀerence in insider ownership between announcing and non-
announcing ﬁrms we examine the distribution of insider ownership in more detail. The
main reason for examining this more closely is that the insider data may overestimate the
true insider holdings. The construction of the insider data is based on the actual reports
from the transactions reported by insiders to the OSE.51 However, since insiders are not
required to report to the OSE when leaving the ﬁrm, or his subsequent transactions, the
holdings of these insiders persist in the data. One eﬀect of this is that the insider fraction
in some instances may become very high, and in some instances 100%. This is of course
not possible since the ﬁrm in that case would not be listed on the OSE. Despite this bias,
we do not expect there to be more extreme insider ﬁrms among the announcing ﬁrms than
among the non-announcing ﬁrms except if insiders are more active in on of the groups.
However, we want to examine the eﬀect of this bias more closely. To do this, we remove
all ﬁrms with more than 90% insider ownership, and recalculate the insider statistics.
The results from the truncations are reported in table 7. In panel A of the table,
we examine the cross-sectional distribution of the total insider ownership for the whole
period. If there is a systematic bias towards one of the groups removing the extreme
observations should make the two distributions more similar. Doing this decreases the
mean total insider fraction for the non-announcing ﬁrms from 8% to 7%, and for the
announcing ﬁrms from 20% to 14%. However, the diﬀerence in means is still signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. Also for the separate years, there is a decrease in the mean for both groups.
For 1999 the diﬀerence in insider ownership becomes insigniﬁcant, but for 2000 and 2001 it
is still signiﬁcant at the 1% level. When we perform the the same exercise for the primary
insiders the results go in the same direction, but the change is less pronounced since there
is fewer ﬁrms with extreme primary insider ownership.
Removing the insider fractions above 90% seems to reduce both averages similarly
for the two groups, such that there is no systematic bias towards the announcing ﬁrms.
However, an insider fraction>90% is still not uninteresting, because it captures a feature
in the data in that insiders are more active in these ﬁrms. Thus, we do not remove them
from the rest of the analysis, but acknowledge that there is a potential bias relative to the
insider data.
5.4 Changes in ownership in repurchasing ﬁrms
So far, we have examined the average ownership in ﬁrms that announces a repurchase
plan. We now turn to examining how the various ownership variables change during the
course of the repurchase program. This is done by examining the ownership character-
istics one month before ﬁrms executes their ﬁrst repurchases, relative to the ownership
characteristics for the same ﬁrms 12 months and 24 months afterwards. Thus, for each
ownership variable we have a cross section of values before the ﬁrms execute their ﬁrst
repurchase and a cross section of values 12 (and 24) months after the ﬁrms initial repur-
chase. Note that the months vary across ﬁrms, such that the analysis is essentially similar
to an event study where ﬁrms that experience an event at diﬀerent points in time are
aligned in event time. One concern with this is that there may have been a trend in the
ownership variables through the sample period, and that the change reﬂect these trends.
However, in table 2 there is not any indication that there has been a large change in the
average for any of the variables across all ﬁrms at the OSE during the sample period. In
51An insider is required to report any transaction to the OSE before 10 am the following day.
32Table 7: Distribution of total insider ownership
The table shows the distribution of total insider ownership across the two groups of announcing and non-
announcing ﬁrms. In ﬁrst part of panel A (“Full sample”), we use all ﬁrms in the sample. In the second
part (“Truncated”) we remove all ﬁrms that have an average insider ownership greater than 90% for both




a signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The tests are adjusted for diﬀerences
in variances between the two distributions if the variance is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In panel B we examine
the distribution of insider ownership across ﬁrms that announce/do not announce within each year.
Panel A: Cross sectional distribution of insider ownership - whole period
Insider ownership distribution std.dev
Firms p25 Median Mean P75 p90 max mean
Full sample
-Non-announcing 152 0.000 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.26 1.00 0.19
-Announcing 149 0.002 0.04 0.20∗∗∗ 0.27 0.70 1.00 0.30
Truncated sample
-Non-announcing 144 0.000 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.24 0.88 0.16
-Announcing 139 0.001 0.03 0.14∗∗∗ 0.21 0.59 0.87 0.22
Panel B: Cross sectional distribution of insider ownership - separate years
Insider ownership distribution std.dev
Firms p25 Median Mean P75 p90 max mean
Year 1999
Full sample
-Non-announcing 193 0.000 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.39 1.00 0.22
-Announcing 78 0.001 0.05 0.23∗∗∗ 0.33 0.93 1.00 0.33
Truncated sample
-Non-announcing 182 0.000 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.34 0.88 0.17
-Announcing 69 0.001 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.43 0.87 0.20
Year 2000
Full sample
-Non-announcing 181 0.000 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.41 1.00 0.24
-Announcing 80 0.003 0.06 0.23∗∗∗ 0.40 0.81 1.00 0.32
Truncated sample
-Non-announcing 169 0.000 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.30 0.88 0.16
-Announcing 73 0.003 0.04 0.16∗∗∗ 0.24 0.51 0.85 0.23
Year 2001
Full sample
-Non-announcing 145 0.000 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.26 1.00 0.24
-Announcing 100 0.003 0.06 0.21∗∗∗ 0.34 0.69 1.00 0.29
Truncated sample
-Non-announcing 135 0.000 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.21 0.88 0.16
-Announcing 94 0.002 0.04 0.16∗∗∗ 0.29 0.51 0.88 0.22
33addition, since diﬀerent ﬁrms execute their ﬁrst repurchase throughout the entire sample
period, this will mitigate the eﬀect from a trend in the ownership variables.
To examine whether there is a change in the various ownership variables before and
after the initial repurchases, we run a paired test for diﬀerences in means, where the null
hypothesis is that the cross sectional mean for each variable is equal before and after the
initial repurchase. The results from this analysis is shown in table 8. The left section of
the table shows the results when we examine the change over a 12 month period after
the ﬁrms execute their ﬁrst repurchase, while the right part of the table shows the results
for changes over a 24 month period. For each variable the table shows the cross sectional
mean one month before ﬁrms repurchase for the ﬁrst time (“before”), and the mean 12
or 24 months after the initial repurchase (“after”), the p-value from the paired test, and
an indicator for the change in the mean (“direction”). Note that the means before are
diﬀerent when we use a 12 month period from when we use a 24 month period. This is
because we loose observations when we examine the longest period since we only have
ownership data through 2002 such that ﬁrms repurchasing for the ﬁrst time in 2001 drop
out of the sample.
As would be expected, the repurchases increase the concentration both relative to the
total fraction owned by the 5 largest owners as well as relative to the Herﬁndahl index.
However, the change in the Herﬁndahl index is only signiﬁcant at the 5% level when we
consider the 24 month change in the index. Relative to the separate ownership fractions
of the ﬁve largest owners, only the largest owner has a signiﬁcant increase in the fraction,
which suggests that the change in concentration is to a large degree is due to the increased
ownership of the largest owner. The ownership fraction of all- and primary insiders in-
creases, but not signiﬁcantly. The fraction owned by the state increases signiﬁcantly both
for the 12 and 24 month periods. One reason for this may be that the state often is a
long-term investor, and are more likely to retain its shares through the repurchase period,
increasing its proportional ownership when the ﬁrm repurchase. On the other hand the
ownership of institutional (ﬁnancial) and individual investors decreases when ﬁrm repur-
chase shares. There may be several reasons for this. If personal investors are afraid of
being expropriated (Brennan and Thakor, 1990) or has a preference for dividends they
may reduce their ownership in repurchasing ﬁrms. Alternatively, since both institutional
and personal investors probably are those owners that trade most frequently (as opposed
to the state, foreigners and other companies) among the diﬀerent owner types, they are
more likely to sell their shares back to the company when it purchase shares in the open
market. Interestingly, the decrease in institutional ownership is opposite of what Grinstein
and Michaely (2001) ﬁnd for a sample of public ﬁrms in the US. Why this diﬀerence ap-
pear is diﬃcult to say. However, it may be argued that this is something one would expect
to see. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that ﬁrms pay dividends to attract institutions.
In addition, many institutional investors also have restrictions with respect to investing
in non-dividend paying ﬁrms. From this point of view, one would expect institutions to
reduce their ownership if ﬁrms that substitute repurchases for dividends.
Finally, when we examine the change in the number of owners of the diﬀerent owner
types, we ﬁnd that the average total number of owners declines during both periods, and
that there is a decrease in the number of ﬁnancial, non-ﬁnancial and individual owners,
while the number of foreign owners is relatively stable. In addition, the number of state
owners increase during the 24 month period which reﬂect that these owners not only retain
their shares, but that repurchasing ﬁrms may attract investors of this type.
34Table 8: Changes in ownership in repurchasing ﬁrms
The table show the results from a paired test for diﬀerences in means for the 12 month and 24 month
period after ﬁrms repurchase shares for the ﬁrst time. For each period, the table shows the average for
the respective variable one month before the ﬁrms execute their ﬁrst repurchase (“before”), 12 (or 24)
months afterwards (“after”), the p-value from the test for the mean before and after being equal, as well
as a column showing the direction of the change (“direction”). The numbers in parentheses below each
mean show the standard deviation of the mean for the respective variable.
12 month period (N=90) 24 month period (N=67)
Concentration before after p-value direction Before After p-value direction
Herﬁndahl index 0.138 0.166 0.09 + 0.110 0.160 0.02 +
(0.177) (0.236) (0.085) (0.194)
5 largest owners 0.522 0.545 0.04 + 0.509 0.565 <0.01 +
(0.205) (0.218) (0.174) (0.212)
12 month period (N=90) 24 month period (N=67)
Ownership before after p-value direction before after p-value direction
fraction
1st largest 0.265 0.288 0.10 + 0.242 0.288 0.02 +
(0.193) (0.231) (0.143) (0.207)
2nd largest 0.108 0.106 0.58 - 0.113 0.118 0.38 +
(0.065) (0.067) (0.06) (0.066)
3rd largest 0.066 0.067 0.97 + 0.066 0.071 0.18 +
(0.036) (0.038) (0.029) (0.039)
4th larges 0.047 0.048 0.50 + 0.049 0.050 0.48 +
(0.025) (0.027) (0.022) (0.024)
5th largest 0.036 0.036 0.66 + 0.039 0.038 0.53 -
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
All insiders 0.227 0.235 0.60 + 0.228 0.235 0.71 +
(0.336) (0.336) (0.328) (0.319)
Primary insiders 0.107 0.115 0.56 + 0.106 0.121 0.46 +
(0.23) (0.24) (0.225) (0.247)
State 0.043 0.048 0.01 + 0.053 0.060 <0.01 +
(0.114) (0.118) (0.13) (0.137)
Foreigners 0.167 0.176 0.49 + 0.181 0.220 0.09 +
(0.183) (0.208) (0.188) (0.251)
Financials 0.176 0.158 0.05 - 0.186 0.140 <0.01 -
(0.152) (0.141) (0.127) (0.102)
Non-ﬁnancials 0.410 0.426 0.16 + 0.378 0.397 0.29 +
(0.248) (0.258) (0.223) (0.244)
Individuals 0.206 0.193 0.04 - 0.203 0.185 0.05 -
(0.172) (0.171) (0.161) (0.162)
12 month period (N=90) 24 month period (N=67)
Number of before after p-value direction before after p-value direction
owners
All owners 4521 4219 0.35 - 5410 4892 0.25 -
(9044) (8543) (10312) (9519)
State 7 7 0.16 + 7 10 <0.01 +
(11) (13) (12) (15)
Foreigners 219 214 0.84 - 262 262 0.99 +
(484) (479) (553) (553)
Financials 60 57 0.20 - 66 57 0.02 -
(65) (67) (69) (65)
Non-ﬁnancials 242 215 <0.01 - 276 222 <0.01 -
(314) (283) (352) (277)
Individuals 3993 3725 0.37 - 4799 4341 0.26 -
(8340) (7849) (9515) (8765)
356 The probability of announcement
Having examined the ownership structure characteristics of ﬁrms that use repurchases, we
now examine whether the ownership structure aﬀect the propensity for a ﬁrm to announce
a repurchase plan. Thus, in this section we examine in more detail whether there are
systematic relation between the ownership structure of ﬁrms and the probability of seeing
a ﬁrm announcing a repurchase plan during the following period, conditional on ownership
variables at a ﬁxed point in time. To do this we estimate a binary regression model for
estimating the eﬀect of various ownership variables on the propensity for ﬁrms to announce
(Ann) a repurchase program. The general model to be estimated is,
Prob(Ann) = F(β0x) (1)
where β0x is the index function, with x containing the explanatory variables for each ﬁrm,
β is a vector of coeﬃcients and F(·) is the cumulative distribution function. The model is
estimated as a binary regression model by assuming that a variable Ann∈ {1,0}, which is
the event of a ﬁrm announcing a repurchase plan or not, is related to a set of explanatory
variables x.52 We estimate models based on both a probit and logit speciﬁcation by
maximum likelihood.53 However, since the results the two speciﬁcations are very similar,
we report only results from the logit estimation.54
6.1 Variable selection
Before we continue, we need to select variables (x) that may be argued to be important
for why ﬁrms initiate a repurchase plan. Since the set of ownership variables available
to us has been examined earlier in the paper, the estimation results are likely to reﬂect
many of the patterns found in the descriptive part. However, by estimating a model we
are better able to address the relative importance of the various variables.
The ﬁrst variable we include in the analysis is the insider fraction. As discussed
earlier, agency theory predict that higher insider ownership align the interests of inside-
and outside owners such that the need for external monitoring is reduced. In that case,
the need for cash distribution to mitigate agency costs would be lower such that ﬁrms
with high insider ownership should not be expected to initiate repurchase programs as
often as ﬁrms with low insider ownership. Alternatively, insiders may also want to initiate
a repurchase plan to maximize their future wealth, to increase the value of their options,
entrench themselves, counter takeovers or to expropriate outside shareholders. To examine
whether a very high insider ownership has any eﬀect on the propensity for ﬁrms to initiate
a repurchase program, we also create a dummy variable (“High insider ownership”) which
is equal to 1 if the insider stake is larger than 33% and zero if not.55 If the insiders have
a large stake in the ﬁrm, they may vote against the initiation of a repurchase program,
eﬀectively stopping it. Alternatively, they may also force a repurchase program through,
if they have a strong preference for repurchases.
52A more detailed explanation is provided in appendix A.
53The proc logistic, proc probit in addition to the proc mixed procedures, provided in SAS v.8.2 are
used for the numerical optimizations.
54Also as noted in Greene (2000), the diﬀerence between a logit and probit speciﬁcation is generally very
small unless for very large samples.
55The threshold is not related to any theoretical predictions, but merely reﬂect whether insiders has a
super minority (1/3).
36Another variable that is predicted by agency theory to be important for the quality
of corporate governance is ownership concentration. A higher concentration is expected
to improve monitoring such that the need for additional mechanisms to restrict managers
to waste cash, such as repurchases, are reduced. In addition, we create a dummy variable
to examine whether ﬁrms with a large controlling shareholder are more or less likely to
announce a repurchase plan. The dummy variable (“Largest owner >67%”) is equal to
one if the largest shareholder has a super-majority (ownership fraction > 2/3). A very
large owner may have very strong incentives to monitor the management of the ﬁrm,
reducing the need for additional mechanisms to discipline management. Alternatively, a
large controlling shareholder can also eﬀectively block the proposal of a repurchase plan
by voting against it.
We also have information about the type of the largest owner. Moreover, we know
whether the largest owner is a state-, foreign-, ﬁnancial-, nonﬁnancial- or individual owner.
Since the identity of the largest owner may be important with respect to the incentive to
monitor, we create dummies, which are interacted with the fraction owned by the largest
owner to examine this. For example, it might be that personal owners are better monitorers
than other owners, such as large corporations or the state, because the quality of the ﬁrm
aﬀect their wealth more directly. On the other hand, it may be that institutional investors
are more competent with respect to how the ﬁrm should be run and have a preference for
dividend payments which would make them more inclined to vote against the proposal of
a repurchase program.
Another variable which may aﬀect the motivation for why a ﬁrm announces a repur-
chase plan is the dividend history of a ﬁrm. If ﬁrms are reluctant to reduce their dividends
and engage in dividend smoothing, as suggested by Lintner (1956) and Brav et al. (2003),
a ﬁrm that has paid dividends previously may be less likely to initiate a repurchase plan if
it plans on maintaining its dividend rate. In addition, the size of the ﬁrm may be impor-
tant since larger ﬁrms generally have more shareholders and potentially a more dispersed
ownership.
In addition, we examine various model speciﬁcations to investigate whether the total
number of owners, the number of owners by the diﬀerent owner-types as well as their
ownership proportions aﬀect the propensity for ﬁrms to announce a repurchase plan. With
respect to the discussion earlier, a high number of owners may be a motivation for ﬁrms
to repurchase shares in the ﬁrst place.
6.2 Estimation results
We estimate the models in the beginning of 1999, 2000 and 2001 with a prediction period
of 12 months. Thus, for each year we use the most recent information before we estimate
the models.56 Furthermore, all ﬁrms that were not yet listed at the beginning of the
estimation year is excluded from the estimation for the respective year.
Table 9 report the correlations between various variables in, 1999 and 2000, that we
examine in the various models. The lower triangular part of the table show the correla-
tions for January 1999 and the upper triangular part of the table shows the correlations
for January 2000. For each pair of variables, the table shows the correlation with the
associated p-value from a test of the correlation being equal to zero. First of all, most
of the correlations are of the same magnitude and sign for the two years which is be-
cause most of the ownership variables are very persistent across time. In addition, the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38correlations for 2001 are similar to those shown for 1999 and 2000. As expected, several
of the variables are highly correlated. First of all, the insider fraction (all insiders) has
the highest correlation with the fraction owned by nonﬁnancial owners (although only
signiﬁcant for 1999) and the second largest owner.57 Although not shown in the table, the
correlation between primary insider ownership and the total insider ownership is about
0.85, and highly signiﬁcant. The Herﬁndahl index58 has a correlation of more than 0.8
with the concentration measure (sum of fraction owned by the ﬁve largest owners) and
a correlation of 0.96 with the fraction owned by the largest shareholder in 1999, and a
negative correlation with the 3rd-5th largest shareholders.
Furthermore, the ownership fraction owned by the largest owners both in aggregate and
separately is not correlated with the size of the ﬁrm (MCAP). Also, relating to the previous
discussion on the ownership of foreign investors, we see that their ownership fraction is
signiﬁcantly positively correlated with the size of the ﬁrm indicating that they are mainly
investing in the largest companies to track the OSE all share index for diversiﬁcation
reasons. Furthermore, the fraction owned by individual owners are negatively correlated
with the concentration measures, the ownership of the largest owner as well as the fraction
owned by the other owner types. Another correlation that is not shown in the table, is the
correlation between the dividend other variables. The dividend has the highest correlation
with market capitalization, with correlation of about 0.22, which indicate that larger ﬁrms
pay more dividends. However, the dividend variable is not highly correlated with any other
variables.
Table 10 report the estimation results when we estimate the propensity for ﬁrm to
announce a repurchase plan during each year given the ownership characteristics at the
beginning of the year.59
For each year we estimate three diﬀerent models with various variable combinations
that are not highly correlated. In model (1) for each year, we examine the concentration
(fraction owned by the 5 largest owners), the insider ownership fraction, the ﬁrm size
(natural log of the market capitalization), a dummy variable for whether the ﬁrm paid
dividends in the previous year. In model (2) we examine whether the identity of the largest
owner is important by including the ownership fraction of the largest owner conditional on
whether he is a state-, foreign-, ﬁnancial-, nonﬁnancial- or individual owner. In addition we
include the the dividend dummy and the market capitalization. In model (3) we examine
the eﬀect of a large controlling owner and high insider ownership.60
The results from the estimation reﬂect to a large degree what was found in the descrip-
tive part of the analysis. However some new results appear. First, looking at model (1),
the concentration does not seem to be important for any year with respect to whether the
57This points to one problem with the data. We are unable to distinguish cases where the largest owners
also are primary insiders.
58The Herﬁndahl index is the sum of the squared ownership fractions of all owners in a ﬁrm.
59Since we model the probability of announcement, the sign of the parameter estimates reﬂect the
direction that the independent variable aﬀect the probability of announcement. To evaluate the eﬀect of a
variable on the probability of announcement, one can calculate the change in the probability Prob(Ann) =
exp(x
0β)/[1 + exp(x
0β)] by keeping the other variables ﬁxed at their sample means, and vary the mean
of the variable under study. The term exp(x
0β), with all x’s at the sample means is the odds ratio.
For example, in model (1) for 1999, and increase in the insider ownership from 0% to 20% increases the
probability of announcement by 5%.
60The number of ﬁrms with an insider ownership greater than 33% is 35 in 1999, 43 in 2000 and 42 in
2001. For the large shareholder dummy, 18 ﬁrms had a controlling shareholder in 1999, 34 in 2000 and 36
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40ﬁrm announces a repurchase plan, while the propensity for ﬁrms to announce is positively
related to the insider ownership for all years. In addition, the results also suggest that large
ﬁrms are more likely to announce, at least for 2000 and 2001. Since the correlation be-
tween concentration and ﬁrm size is very low, it does not reﬂect that large ﬁrms announce
because they have a more dispersed ownership. Furthermore, whether the ﬁrm has paid
dividends the previous year is a very important decision variable across all years and model
speciﬁcations. This indicates that ﬁrms that historically has paid dividends are smoothing
dividends, and reluctant to reduce dividends to facilitate a repurchase program. Relative
to the identity of the largest owner, we do not ﬁnd any systematic signiﬁcant relationship
across the years.
In model (2), we examine whether the identity of the largest owner may contribute
to the announcement of a repurchase program. For 1999, the results indicate that ﬁrms
where the largest owner is another ﬁrm (nonﬁnancial) or an institutional owner are more
likely to initiate a program. However, across diﬀerent years, there is no evidence that the
identity of the largest owner is important.
Although, the identity of the owner is not important, the size of the owner might
be. To check this, model (3) examines whether a controlling owner or a large insider is
important with respect to whether a ﬁrm announces a repurchase plan. The result indicate
that a large controlling shareholder reduces the probability of observing an announcement.
As discussed earlier, this may be because ﬁrms with a very large shareholder are closely
monitored such that additional mechanisms to discipline management are not needed.
Alternatively, large owners are may also resist the proposal of a repurchase plan. Thus, if
a large owner prefers dividends, or has a preference against repurchases, he can eﬀectively
block any proposal of a repurchase program. The dummy for high insider ownership is
positive for all years, but less signiﬁcant in 1999. In table 11 we extend the estimation
period to 24 months, and estimate the models for 1999 and 2000. The results are similar,
but somewhat stronger than the results in table 10.
We also estimate models examining whether the quick ratio as a proxy for liquidity
aﬀect the propensity for ﬁrms to announce a repurchase plan. However, it is not signiﬁ-
cant. Appendix B show additional model estimations where we also investigate the total
number of owners and the number of owners by diﬀerent owner-types. Before interpreting
these results, it is important to note that the number of owners is highly correlated with
the size of the ﬁrm. In addition, the number of owners in each category is also highly
correlated with eachother. Thus, in tables 12 and 13 in the appendix we see that the mar-
ket capitalization is rendered insigniﬁcant due to the multicolinearity. Additional models,
with each ownertypes ownership fraction are also estimated, but not shown in a table.
The results for the ownership fractions by type of owner are not signiﬁcant except for the
fraction owned by individuals which is has a negative eﬀect. For models with the separate
ownerships of the ﬁve largest owners, the results are ambiguous. This because the owner-
ship proportions of the largest 3rd-5th owners are strongly negatively correlated with the
the ownership of the largest owner, and positively correlated with eachother. However,
when estimating separate models, we ﬁnd that the ownership of the largest owner has
a negative eﬀect on the propensity to initiate a repurchase program, consistent with the
result for the dummy variable for the controlling shareholder in table 10.
One thing to note about the estimations is that we do not remove ﬁrms that has pre-
viously announced a repurchase plan. Since several of the variables are highly persistent,
ﬁrms that are more likely to announce every year, will be included in the model estimation
every year. To study the eﬀect of this, we also estimate models where all ﬁrms that has
41Table 11: The probability of announcement - 24 month interval
The table shows the results from the estimation of a logit model, Prob(Ann) = F(β
0x), with the table
showing the β estimates for the independent variables for four diﬀerent model speciﬁcations starting in
1999 and 2000. The models are estimated at the beginning of each year, with the dependent variable equal
to 1 if the ﬁrm announces a repurchase plan during the year, and equal to zero if it does not. The table
shows the estimation results when we estimate the model looking 24 months forward from January each
year. The models are estimated in January each year. The independent variables are the total fraction
owned by the ﬁve largest owners (concentration), the fraction owned by the insiders of the ﬁrm (insider
fraction), the natural log of the market capitalization, a dummy for whether the ﬁrm paid dividend the
previous year, the total number of owners (“number of owners”) and the number of owners by various
owner-types, a dummy for whether the insiders owns more than 33% of the ﬁrm (High insider ownership)
and a dummy for whether the largest owner has a super-majority (Largest owner >67%).
Model 1999 Model 2000
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -5.22∗∗ -5.53∗∗∗ -5.42∗∗ -6.33∗∗∗ -6.81∗∗∗ -6.84∗∗∗
Concentration -0.02 · · -0.88 · ·
Insider fraction 1.59∗∗∗ · · 1.76∗∗∗ · ·
MCAP (log) 0.30∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
Dividend -1.12∗∗∗ -0.98∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗ -1.66∗∗∗ -1.66∗∗∗ -1.69∗∗∗
largest state · -0.81 · · -1.18 ·
largest foreigner · -2.05 · · -0.93 ·
largest ﬁnancial · 4.91∗ · · 4.78 ·
largest nonﬁnancial · 0.71∗∗ · · 1.45∗ ·
largest individual · 2.71∗ · · 2.26 ·
Largest owner >67% · · -1.57∗∗ · · -2.47∗∗∗
High insider ownership · · 1.10∗∗∗ · · 0.94∗∗
N(Announcing) 117 117 117 118 118 118
N(Non announcing) 94 94 94 74 74 74
Pseudo R square 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.19
AIC 281 287 280 231 241 229
Likelihood ratio (p value) <.001 <.001 0.02 <.001 <.001 <.001
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.45 0.39 0.92 0.91 0.67 0.86
% concordant 66.2 66.7 68.4 74.8 71.2 76.7
42announced in previous years are removed from the sample. For example, when estimating
the model for 2000, we remove all ﬁrms that announced before 2000. Although the results
for 1999 remains the same, the results for 2000 becomes weaker while the estimation in
2001 is problematic since we are left with very few ﬁrms in both categories. However, it
is not obvious that we should remove ﬁrms that has announced the previous year since it
is the characteristics of these ﬁrms that we are interested in.
To summarize, the results from the model estimations above is not supportive of
an agency story where ﬁrms initiate a repurchase program to mitigate agency problems.
Although announcing ﬁrms have more shareholders, and a lower concentration on average,
other variables seem more important in explaining the propensity for ﬁrms to initiate a
repurchase program. The variables that are the most important decision variables are the
previous dividend history of the ﬁrm, the insider ownership, and the existence of a large,
controlling, shareholder. Another interesting ﬁnding is that the identity of the largest
owner, or the identity of owners in general, is not important for the decision to initiate a
repurchase program.
Although these ﬁndings may be interpreted in several ways, the results are in line
with models where insiders have incentives to support a repurchase program to maximize
their future wealth when they have a stake in the company (Isagawa, 2000), expropriate
outside shareholders or to entrench themselves and reduce the probability of takeovers.
On the other hand this interpretation is not unambiguous as the existence of a controlling
shareholder decreases the probability of announcement. This is the opposite of what is the
prediction in the model by Brennan and Thakor (1990). One implication from their model
is that large shareholders will prefer repurchases to dividends, while small shareholders
will prefer dividends. Our results instead suggest that controlling shareholders oppose
repurchases or that additional mechanisms for distributing excess cash is not needed when
a large shareholder is in place to monitor the management.
7 Conclusion
This study provide a detailed examination of the ownership in Norwegian ﬁrms that ini-
tiates repurchase programs. The main motivation is that a repurchase is an important
corporate event, which has the eﬀect of altering the ownership structure. In addition, few
studies study in detail the ownership in ﬁrms that initiate repurchase programs. Since a
repurchase is a ﬂexible way for ﬁrms to distribute cash, it may be used by managers as
a self imposed disciplinary mechanism which reduce cash holdings and mitigate agency
costs when other corporate governance mechanisms are not in place. On the other hand,
theoretical models also suggest that managers can use repurchases to pursue their own
objectives. For example, if there is asymmetric information between the manager and
outside shareholders, a repurchase can be used to increase his ownership in undervalued
ﬁrms transferring wealth from outside owners to himself and the remaining shareholders.
In addition, a repurchase may decrease the probability of value enhancing takeovers which
would beneﬁt shareholders, but threaten the position of the manager and potentially make
him loose control over the ﬁrms resources.
The paper documents some interesting patterns in the ownership structure of Norwe-
gian ﬁrms that initiate repurchase plans. Moreover, the descriptive statistics indicate that
the ownership concentration in ﬁrms that announce repurchase plans is much lower than
in non-announcing ﬁrms. This is to a large degree because the largest shareholder in these
43ﬁrms has a much lower stake in the ﬁrm. In addition, announcing ﬁrms also have a much
higher number of shareholders across all owner-types. These ﬁndings are consistent with
an agency theoretical explanation for why ﬁrms repurchase shares. Because owners in
these ﬁrms potentially have a much lower incentives to monitor management, repurchases
can be used as an additional mechanisms to mitigate agency costs (Jensen, 1986). How-
ever, the large number of shareholders may also be the main reason for ﬁrms repurchasing
shares in the ﬁrst place. By removing the smallest shareholders, the concentration po-
tentially increases, such that monitoring quality improves as the remaining shareholders
increases their cash-ﬂow and voting rights.
When examining the insider ownership in announcing ﬁrms, another picture emerges.
The results suggest that repurchasing ﬁrms have a much higher insider ownership than non-
announcing ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is not consistent with an interpretation where ﬁrms with
dispersed ownership uses repurchases to mitigate agency costs of free cash. Agency theory
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) predicts that the interests of inside- and outside shareholders
converge when the insider ownership increases. Thus, from a monitoring perspective, we
would expect repurchasing ﬁrms to instead have a lower insider ownership. This ﬁnding
support models where ﬁrms with high insider ownership is expected to repurchase shares.
These models predict that managers with a stake in the ﬁrm (through stock ownership
or options) use repurchases to increase their expected future payoﬀs (Isagawa, 2000). In
addition, the manager can use repurchases to increase his (and remaining shareholders)
ownership proportion in an undervalued ﬁrm or to deter takeovers (Bagwell, 1991).
When examining how the ownership composition changes in ﬁrms that repurchase
shares, we ﬁnd that the concentration increases as would be expected. This increase in
concentration, seem to be mainly driven by an increased ownership of the largest owner.
In addition, the fraction owned by institutions and personal investors decreases. This
may both be because these investors trade more actively than the other owner types such
that they have a higher probability of selling shares back to the ﬁrm. Alternatively they
may have a preference for dividends, making them reduce their ownership in ﬁrms that
substitute dividends for repurchases.
The paper also examines whether ownership variables can be used to say something
about ﬁrms propensity to initiate a repurchase program. This is done by estimating a
binary model for the probability of observing a ﬁrm announcing a program during each
year, given the ownership composition at the beginning of the year. The results reﬂect to
a large degree the ﬁndings in the descriptive analysis. Moreover, the ﬁndings would be in
line with models where insiders have incentives to support the initiation of a repurchase
program either to maximize the future value of their wealth (Isagawa, 2000), expropriate
outside shareholders or to entrench themselves.
On the other hand the ﬁnding that the existence of a controlling shareholder decreases
the probability of observing the introduction of a repurchase program. There are several
interpretations for this ﬁnding. One is that a controlling shareholder may oppose a repur-
chase program. Alternatively, additional mechanisms for distributing excess cash is not
needed when a large shareholder is in place with strong incentives to monitor the man-
agement. Interestingly, this ﬁnding is the opposite of what is the prediction in the model
by Brennan and Thakor (1990). In their model, large shareholders prefer repurchases to
dividends, while small shareholders has a preference for dividends. With respect to the
identity of the largest owner in general, we ﬁnd no evidence that the type of this owner
is important for the decision to initiate a repurchase program. Finally, the results also
strongly suggest that ﬁrms that paid dividends in the previous year are less likely to initi-
44ate a repurchase program. This is likely related to dividend smoothing, and that ﬁrms are
reluctant to cutting dividends as suggested in studies by Lintner (1956) and Brav et al.
(2003).
45A The probability of observing an announcement
At a general level, the model for the probability of announcement (Ann) can be written
as,
Prob(Ann) = F(β0x) (2)
where β0x is the index function, with x as a matrix of explanatory variables for each ﬁrm,
β is a vector of coeﬃcients and F(·) is the cumulative distribution function. The model is
estimated as a binary regression model by assuming that a variable Ann∈ {1,0}, which is
the event of a ﬁrm announcing a repurchase plan or not, is related to a set of explanatory
variables x. A linear combination of these variables constitute an index A∗ which is related
to Ann in the following way,
A∗ = β0x + i = β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + .... + βkxik + i (3)
and Ann = 1 if A∗ > 0 (4)
Ann = 0 if A∗ ≤ 0 (5)
where β0x is the index function, and the error term i has a logistic or normal distribution
with mean 0 and variance 1. Finally, we can write the probability that Ann= 1, the
probability of observing the announcement of a repurchase plan during the next M months,
as,
Prob(Ann) = Prob(A∗ > 0) = Prob(β0x) > 0 = Prob(i > −β0x) (6)
Since both the normal and logistic distributions are symmetric, this can be expressed as,
Prob(Ann) = Prob(A∗ > 0) = Prob( < β0x) = F(β0x) (7)
where F(·) deﬁnes the cumulative distribution function for . If F(·) is assumed to be a
logistic distribution, the model is referred to as a logistic model, and if assumed to be the
normal distribution, the model is referred to as a probit model.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48Table 13: The probability of announcement (number of owners) - 24 month interval
The table shows the results from the estimation of a logit model, Prob(Ann) = F(β
0x), with the table
showing the β estimates for the independent variables for four diﬀerent model speciﬁcations starting in
1999 and 2000. The models are estimated at the beginning of each year, with the dependent variable equal
to 1 if the ﬁrm announces a repurchase plan during the year, and equal to zero if it do not. The table
shows the estimation results when we estimate the model looking 24 months forward from January each
year. The models are estimated in January each year. The independent variables are the total fraction
owned by the ﬁve largest owners (concentration), the fraction owned by the insiders of the ﬁrm (insider
fraction), the natural log of the market capitalization, a dummy for whether the ﬁrm paid dividend the
previous year, the total number of owners (“number of owners”) and the number of owners by various
owner-types, a dummy for whether the insiders owns more than 33% of the ﬁrm (High insider ownership)
and a dummy for whether the largest owner has a super-majority (Largest owner >67%).
Model 1999 Model 2000
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -5.05∗∗ -1.95 -1.26 -6.47∗∗∗ -5.54 -5.27
Concentration 0.54 · -0.18 -0.48 · -0.90
Insider fraction 1.48∗∗∗ · 1.50∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ · 1.46∗∗
MCAP (log) 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.35∗∗∗ 0.28∗ 0.30∗
Dividend -1.21∗∗∗ -0.82∗∗ -0.95∗∗∗ -1.62∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗
Number of owners 0.31∗∗ · · 0.14 · ·
State owners · -0.14 -0.14 · -0.42 -0.32
Foreign owners · 0.54∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ · 0.37∗ 0.38∗
Financial owners · -0.34 -0.25 · 0.03 -0.06
Nonﬁnancial owners · 0.58 0.70 · 0.19 0.23
Individual owners · -0.35∗ -0.36∗ · -0.10 -0.14
N(Announcing) 117 117 117 118 118 118
N(Non-announcing) 94 94 94 74 74 74
Pseudo R-square 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.19
AIC 278 280 272 232 239 235
Likelihood ratio (p-value) <.001 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.12 0.74 0.85 0.25 0.45 0.39
% concordant 68.3 70.1 73.4 74.4 74.7 75.9
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